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SIN, SCANDAL, AND SUBSTANTIVE DUE
PROCESS: PERSONAL JURISDICTION AND
PENNOYER RECONSIDERED
Wendy Collins Perdue*
"Confusion now hath made its masterpiece,"' exclaims Macduff in Act
II of Macbeth. The same might be said of the venerable case, Pennoyer v.
Neff.2 Over 100 years after issuing Pennoyer the Supreme Court is still
laboring to articulate a coherent doctrine of personal jurisdiction within the
framework established by that opinion. Recently, the Court has become
particularly interested in personal jurisdiction and has dealt with the issue
seven times in the last four years. 3 Yet despite this growing body of case
law, the doctrinal underpinnings remain elusive. The Court continues to
treat geographic boundaries as central to the interests protected by personal
jurisdiction, but has never satisfactorily explained why they are so central
or what interest the doctrine of personal jurisdiction is intended to protect.
The Court's recent attempts at clarification starkly pose the core issue of
personal jurisdiction. The Court has observed that "[t]he personal jurisdic-
tion requirement recognizes and protects an individual liberty interest," 4
but has never explained what liberty interest is at stake. This article
explores some of the possible theories of what individual or collective
interests the personal jurisdiction doctrine protects.
As part of the attempt to understand modem doctrine, this article first
reexamines Pennoyer v. Neff. This reexamination goes beyond the Supreme
Court opinion and looks both at the underlying story of the case and the lower
court opinion. The story ofPennoyer v. Neff is of considerable interest in and
of itself. The cast of characters includes a bigamous United States Senator
who was elected under an alias, a governor of Oregon who used his inaugura-
tion as a platform to decry his loss in the case, and an illiterate but litigious
*Associate Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. I am grateful to Richard Chused,
Vicki Jackson, David Perdue, Gerry Spann, and Wendy Williams for their valuable suggestions, and to
my research assistants Sally Paxton and Larry Stoller.
1. W. Shakespeare, Macbeth, Act Il, scene iii, 1.72.
2. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
3. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 107 S. Ct. 1026 (1987); Burger King Corp. v.
Rudzewicz, 105 S. Ct. 2174 (1985); Phillips Petroleum v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985); Helicopteros
Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984); Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984);
Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, 465 U.S. 770 (1984); Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie de
Bauxites des Guinee, 456 U.S. 694 (1982).
4. Insurance Corp. of Ireland, 456 U.S. at 702.
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setiler. In addition, the lower court opinion, all but ignored in most discus-
sions of the case, merits closer attention than it has received. The contrast
between the lower court's narrow approach to the issues, and the Supreme
Court's far more expansive opinion, highlights the extraordinary nature of
Justice Field's opinion. Field, the "prophet" of substantive due process,
seized on Pennoyer as a vehicle to entrench the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment as a barrier to state action inconsistent with natural
law rights, and went far beyond the facts and issues before him to do so.
Field's approach to personal jurisdiction continues to dominate modern
personal jurisdiction doctrine. His opinion in Pennoyer not only laid the
foundation for treating personal jurisdiction as a substantive liberty inter-
est, but also established that geographic boundaries are central in the
protection of that interest. The final section of the article is devoted to an
examination of these surviving elements of Pennoyer.
I. THE UNDERLYING STORY5
As students of civil procedure will recall, 6 Pennoyer v. Neff involved a
collateral attack on a prior default judgment. In the initial suit, one J. H.
Mitchell sued Neff in Oregon state court. Because Neff could not be found
within Oregon, he was served by publication. Neff never appeared and a
defaultjudgment was entered against him. To satisfy thejudgment, Mitchell
attached Neff's Oregon real estate. The property was sold at auction and
Pennoyer later acquired it. Nearly a decade later, Neff returned to Oregon
and brought suit in federal court to evict Pennoyer from the land, claiming
that the original judgment was invalid. The Supreme Court found for Neff in
an opinion that has become a cornerstone of personal jurisdiction doctrine.
These well known facts about the case don't begin to tell the full story.
The rich underlying tale is worth exploring not only to satisfy the curiousity
of "Pennoyer cultists," 7 but also because, as John Noonan has observed,
"Facts which cannot be shown to be crucial to the disposition of a case are
important in grasping how person affected person . . . . Even details
5. Any attempt to recreate the circumstances surrounding events that occurred over 100 years ago is
fraught with obvious difficulties. Establishing the facts about events in which J.H. Mitchell was
involved is particularly difficult because, as one research librarian commented, "Mitchell was the kind
of person who ended his correspondence with burn this letter after reading." The story described here
has been pieced together from a variety of sources and there are inevitable gaps. Recognizing the risks
of doing so, I have filled in some of these gaps with hypotheses or speculation, though I have attempted
to indicate where I have done so.
6. See Silberman, Shaffer v. Heitner: The End of an Era, 53 N.Y.U. L. REV. 33, 33-34 (1978)
(recounting the extraordinary memory of the case by one student).
7. Id. at 44 n.53.
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which are purely extrinsic to any participant in the process have an effect on
the understanding of the case."'8
Our story begins with a young man, Marcus Neff, heading across the
country by covered wagon train, presumably to seek his fortune. Neff left
Iowa in early 1848 at the age of 24,9 joining a wagon train of five companies
of wagons. 10 At that time, the question of Oregon statehood was being
considered in Congress, and there was much speculation that large tracts of
the vast, undeveloped land of Oregon would be made available to home-
steaders. 11 The speculation proved to be correct and Marcus Neff was one
of the earliest settlers to claim land under the Oregon Donation Act. 12
To qualify for land under the Donation Act, one had to be a citizen living
in Oregon and had to submit a request for land by December 1, 1850.13
Interestingly, Neff's land request was originally dated December 15, 1850,
which would have made it too late, but "December" was crossed out and
"September" written in above.14 This is the first instance of many to
suggest that events surrounding Pennoyer v. Neff may have been tainted by
fraud and deception.
Not surprisingly, registration of a Donation Act claim required a certain
amount of paperwork. In addition to the initial claim, the homesteader was
required after four years to submit the affidavits of two disinterested
8. J. NOONAN, JR., PERSONS AND MASKS OF THE LAW 141 (1976).
9. Neff's affidavit, submitted in connection with his land claim, states that he was born in 1826.
10. Oregon Spectator, Sept. 7, 1848, at 3, col. 1.
11. Id. The newspaper article noted that a small company of Packers arrived in Oregon City,
bringing with them news that the House of Representatives had set June 4, 1848, for action on the
Oregon question. The article went on to note that "it was the general impression among the emigrants
and others, that Congress would donate a section of land to the heads of families in Oregon and half a
section to single men."
12. Neff's claim was number 57, making it among the earliest.
13. An Act to Create the Office of Surveyor General, ch. 76, 9 Stat. 496 (1850) [hereinafter "The
Donation Act"]. The Act granted 320 acres (a half section) to a single man, and 640 acres (a whole
section) to a married couple. Interestingly, in the case of a married couple, the land did not go entirely to
the husband. Instead, half was granted to the wife, "to be held by her in her own right." Id. See
generally Chused, The Oregon Donation Act of 1850 and Nineteenth Century Federal Married
Women's Property Law, 2 LAW & HisT. REv. 44 (1984).
14. Notification to the Surveyor General of Oregon, No. 80, Oregon City Land Donation Files,
March 9, 1852 [hereinafter Notification to Surveyor General of Oregon] (notice of Claim for land by
Marcus Neff) (available in Seattle Federal Archives and Record Center, Record Group No. 49). The
same issue of the Oregon Spectator which announced the arrival of the wagon train in which Neff was
traveling, also announced the discovery of gold in California. Oregon Spectator, Sept. 7, 1848, at 2, col.
5. One historian has speculated that upon arriving in Oregon, Neff probably went south to the mines,
returning to Oregon in the fall of 1850, just in time to file a land claim. King, Pennoyer v. Neff: Legal
Landmark, 73 OR. HIsT. Q. 60 (1972); see Oregon Spectator, Nov. 9,1848, at 2, col. 4 (miners return to
Oregon with considerable gold; Oregonians urged to go to California gold mines but to retain Oregon
land claims). Given the correction on Neff's donation claim, it is possible that he returned a little late to
file a donation claim.
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persons affirming that the homesteader had cultivated the land for his own
use. 15 Neff secured two affidavits, which were submitted prematurely in
1853 and resubmitted in 1856.16 The 1856 submission should have entitled
Neff to receive a patent to the land, but the government was notoriously
slow in processing claims, 17 and ten years passed before Neff received his
land patent. 18
Early in 1862 Neff made the unfortunate decision to consult a local
Portland attorney, J.H. Mitchell. 19 Although the nature of the legal services
is unclear, Neff may have consulted Mitchell in an attempt to expedite the
paperwork concerning his land patent.20 Neff was illiterate, 21 and at the time
he consulted Mitchell the government had still not issued his patent.
Mitchell, moreover, specialized in land matters. 22 In mid-1862, several
months after Neff first consulted Mitchell, another affidavit was filed on
Neff's behalf. Several months thereafter Neff received a document from the
government certifying that he had met the criteria for issuance of a patent. 23
Whatever Neff's reasons for seeking Mitchell's legal services, he cer-
tainly could have done better in his choice of lawyers. "J.H. Mitchell" was
actually the Oregon alias of one John Hipple.2 4 Hipple had been a teacher in
Pennsylvania who, after being forced to marry the 15-year-old student
whom he had seduced, left teaching and took up law.25 He practiced with a
partner for several years, but apparently concluded that it was time to move
on to greener pastures. Thus, in 1860 Hipple headed west taking with him
four thousand dollars of client money and his then current paramour, a local
15. The Donation Act, supra note 13, at § 7.
16. Notification to Surveyor General of Oregon, supra note 14.
17. See Messing, Public Lands, Politics and Progressives: The Oregon Land Fraud Trials,
1903-10, 35 PAC. HIsT. REV. 35, 36 (1966).
18. Record Copy of Patent, vol. 5, at 12 (March 19, 1866) (National Archives, Record Group No.
49).
19. See Neff v. Pennoyer, 17 F. Cas. 1279, 1286 (C.C.D. Or. 1875) (No. 10,083), aff'd, 95 U.S. 714
(1877).
20. One reviewer of this period in Oregon has observed that "[b]oth in Washington and the District
Land Offices, influence, friendships, family ties, and money were essential for the proper expediting of
a claim." Messing, supra note 17, at 36.
21. Neff's affidavits submitted in 1852 and his oath of allegiance submitted in 1862 were both
marked with "X" in place of Neff's signature. By 1875, Neff had learned at least to write his name. See
Affidavit of Marcus Neff submitted in McGuire v. Neff, No. 237, District of Oregon (1875).
22. See I M. CLARK, JR., PHARISEE AMONG PHILISTINES: THE DIARY OFJUDGE MATTHEW P. DEADY
1871-92, at 150-51 (1975) [hereinafter DEADY DIARY].
23. Oregon Donation Certificate No. 1416 to Marcus Neff, Dec. 31, 1862 (available in Seattle
Federal Archives and Records Center, Record Group No. 49). Nevertheless, four more years passed
before the general land office granted Neff his patent. Record Copy of Patent, supra note 18.
24. 1 DEADY DIARY, supra note 22, at 151.
25. Id.
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school teacher.26 They made their way to California where Hipple aban-
doned the teacher, ostensibly because she was sick and her medical ex-
penses had become too burdensome, 27 and moved on to Portland, Oregon.
There, using the name John H. Mitchell, 28 he quickly established himself
as a successful lawyer, specializing in land litigation and railroad right-of-
way cases. 29 He also remarried without bothering to divorce his first wife. 30
As one historian has observed, Mitchell's success as a lawyer cannot be
attributed to either intellectual or oratorial skills; rather, his strengths
included exceptional political instincts, a generous disposition, and a
friendly handshake. 31 What he lacked in ethics and ability, he made up for
with persistence and desire for success. 32 In his subsequent political career,
he became known as a man whose "political ethics justified any means that
would win the battle. ",33
Mitchell's ethical standards as a lawyer were no higher than his ethics as
a politician. As the Oregonian observed: "His political methods are indeed
pitched on a sufficiently low scale, but not below his methods as a
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. Mitchell claimed he had dropped his surname, Hipple, and had taken to using his mother's
maiden name in order to escape from "great domestic unhappiness." Washington Star, June 16, 1873,
at 2, col. 1. The name change generated its own set of problems. There was some talk of removing him
from his newly acquired Senate seat becuase he had run under an assumed name. Id. In addition, in
another law suit in which Mitchell and his partner were apparently trying to acquire land as payment for
legal services, the defendants argued that there was an improper joinder of parties because John H.
Mitchell was a mythical personage. See New York Times, Dec. 13, 1873, at 6, col. 7.
29. 1 DEADY DIARY, supra note 22, at 151-52; E. MAcCOLL, THE SHAPING OFA CrrY: BusINass AND
PoLrrIcS IN POrLAND, OREGON 1885-1915, at 202 (1976); Silberman, supra note 6, at 44 n.53.
30. 1 DaADY DIARY, supra note 22, at 151-52. After Mitchell's bigamy came to light, there was
great interest in his views on polygamy in Utah. Id. at 128-29. Ironically, some years after this incident,
Mitchell criticized the Oregon Donation Act as encouraging too many marriages. Mitchell, Oregon:Its
History, Geography and Resources, Nat. Geographic Mag., Apr. 20, 1895, at 266.
31. J. GASTON, THE CENTENNIAL HISTORY OF OREGON 1811-1912, at 665 (1912).
32. See id. at 665-66.
33. Id. at 665. Mitchell had an extremely successful political career. He was first elected to the State
Senate in 1862, became president of the State Senate in 1864, see id. at 666, was seven times a candidate
for the United States Senate, and was elected in four of those contests. See id. at 665. Interestingly,
Mitchell received strong political support from Abigail Scott Duniway, an important leader of the 19th
century western women's movement. Duniway continued to support Mitchell even after it was revealed
that Mitchell was a bigamist and an adulterer. Duniway did urge Mitchell to make "restitution" for the
wrongs he had done to women "by becoming the special champion ofthe rights of all women. . . .[L]et
his Senatorial career be one continued grand atonement to all womanhood for the errors of his youth." R.
MoYNEHAN, REBEL FOR RIGHTS: ABIGAIL ScoTt DUNWAY 173 (1983) (quoting remark made by Mrs.
Duniway). There is no evidence that Mitchell ever undertook such "atonement."
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lawyer. ",34 Given Mitchell's reputation, one might at least question whether
Neff in fact owed the money Mitchell claimed was due. Neff paid Mitchell
$6.50, 35 but Mitchell claimed he was owed an additional $209.36 Although
Mitchell's services were rendered between early 1862 and mid-1863, 37
Mitchell waited several years to take legal action against Neff, perhaps
purposely waiting until Neff left the state.
On November 3, 1865, Mitchell filed suit against Neff in Oregon state
court, seeking $253.14 plus costs. 38 Mitchell secured jurisdiction under
Oregon statute section 55, which provided that if the defendant, after due
diligence, cannot be found within the state, he may be served by publica-
tion. 39 Mitchell supplied an affidavit in which he asserted that Neff was
living somewhere in California and could not be found.40 Mitchell provided
no details as to what he had done to locate Neff, and given Mitchell's lack of
scruples, 41 one might wonder whether Neff's whereabouts were indeed
unknown to Mitchell and whether Mitchell made any attempt to locate
Neff.42 Notice of the lawsuit was published for six weeks in the Pacific
34. Morning Oregonian, Aug. 25, 1882, at 2, col. 1. Two incidents illustrate that Mitchell had no
hesitation about cheating or defrauding his own clients. In one case, a client had consulted Mitchell
concerning certain debts which the client had incurred. Mitchell apparently notified the creditors of his
client's whereabouts, and was appointed by thecreditors to collect the debt. Mitchell then went back to the
client and offered in exchange for$600 to tell the creditors that the debt could not be collected. The client
paid the price. See I DEADY DIARY, supra note 22, at 182 (diary entry Jan. 2, 1875). In another incident,
Mitchell persuaded a recently widowed client to appoint a friend of Mitchell's as guardian of her young
children. Although the guardian soon disappeared, Mitchell, acting on behalf of the guardian, requested
that the court order the sale of real estate inherited by the children. The sale was supposedly to pay
expenses incurred by the guardian in caring for the children, although the children in fact never lived with
orreceived any benefit from the guardian. The sale was ordered and Mitchell purchased the land at auction
for a fraction of its actual value. Mitchell turned around and sold the land at a sizeable profit, while the
widow and her young children were left destitute. See Morning Oregonian, Aug. 25, 1882, at 2, col. 1;
Morning Oregonian, Nov. 25, 1886, at 4, cols. 1-3.
35. See Neff v. Pennoyer, 17 F. Cas. 1279, 1286 (C.C.D. Or. 1875) (No. 10,083), aff'd, 95 U.S. 714
(1877).
36. Id.
37. See Supreme Court Transcript of Record at 7, Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
38. Id. at 6. Judge Deady's statement of the case indicates that Mitchell sought the sum of $253.14
and was awarded $258.18 plus $36.80 in costs. See id. No explanation is given why the default judgment
was $5.04 more than the plaintiff requested.
39. OR. CODE CIv. P. § 55. The text of the statute is reproduced in Pennoyerv. Neff, 95 U.S. at 718.
40. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. at 717.
41. See supra text accompanying notes 24-37 and infra text accompanying notes 119-23.
42. In another lawsuit involving Neff's Oregon property, McGuire v. Neff, No. 237 (Circuit Court of
Oregon for Multnomah County, Complaint dated May 17, 1875), an issue arose whether at the time ofthat
suit Neff was a citizen of California or a citizen of Oregon. Neff removed the case on the basis of diversity
of citizenship and subsequently submitted an affidavit, dated Aug. 30, 1875, in which he asserted that he
was a citizen of California. Affidavit of Marcus Neff filed August 31, 1875, McGuire v. Neff, Judgment
No. 255 (C.C.D. Or. 1875). He described his home and property in California and asserted that he had
been living in San Joaquin County, California for the priorfive years. This suggests he did not move to
California until 1870 and thus may still have been in Oregon when Mitchell sued him in 1865. See also
484
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Christian Advocate, 43 a weekly newspaper published under the authority of
the Methodist Episcopal Church and devoted primarily to religious news
and inspirational articles. 44
In initiating the litigation, Mitchell made what ultimately proved to be a
critical mistake. Mitchell's affidavit asserted that Neff owned property, but
he did not attach the property at that time. Mitchell most likely neglected
this step because Oregon law did not appear to require attachment as a
prerequisite for reliance on section 55.45
A default judgment in the amount of $294.98 was entered against Neff
on February 19, 1866. 46 Although Mitchell had an immediate right to
execute on the judgment, he waited until early July 1866 to seek a writ of
execution, possibly waiting for the arrival of Neff's land patent. The title,
which was sent from Washington, D.C. on March 22, 1866, would have
taken several months to arrive in Oregon, and thus probably arrived in
Oregon shortly before Mitchell sought the writ of execution.47 Inter-
estingly, although Mitchell had alleged that Neff could not be found, the
Oregon land office apparently had no difficulty delivering the patent to
Neff.48
infra note 71.
43. See Pennoyerv. Neff, 95 U.S. at717.
44. The publisher's column of the Pacific Christian Advocate describes it as a weekly periodical
dedicated to issues of religion, temperance, agriculture, education, and general intelligence.
45. Or. Code Civ. P. § 55 (1863). There is, however, another small complication regarding this
matter: at the time Mitchell v. Neff was commenced and even at the time judgment in the case was
rendered, the government had not yet sent Neff his patent for the land. The patent was not issued until
March, 1866, see Neff v. Pennoyer, 17 F. Cas. 1279, 1280, which was a month after the judgment was
entered in Mitchellv. Neff. Thus, an argument might have been made that at the time ofthe action, Neffdid
not yet own property in Oregon. See Lewis, The "Forum State Interest" Factor in PersonalJurisdiction
Adjudications: Home-Court Horses Hauling Constitutional Carts, 33 MERCER L. REv. 769, 769-72
(1982). The practice in Oregon, however, was that if the settler had fulfilled all the prerequisites for
issuance of the patent, then he was treated as the owner, with full rights to transfer the land. See Dolph v.
Barney, 5Or. 191,204(1874),aff'd, 97U.S. 652(1878);seealsoActofJuly 17,1854, ch. 84, § 2,10Stat.
305, § 2 (1854). This argument was not made, however, and the opinions of both the lower court and the
Supreme Court are written on the assumption thatNeff was the owner atthe time of the original judgment.
See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. at 719; Neff v. Pennoyer, 17 F. Cas. at 1281.
46. See Neff v. Pennoyer, 17 F. Cas. at 1280.
47. See id.; Record Copy of Patent, supra note 18.
48. According to the Civil Archives Division of the National Archives, the procedure was that the
patent was issued from the General Land Office in Washington, D.C. and sent to the local land office. In
the case of Neff's patent, it was sent to the Registrar at Oregon City. The local office was responsible for
seeing that the title was delivered to the homesteader. If the homesteader could not be found, the patent
was returned to Washington. There are no notations or correspondence in Neff's file in Washington
indicating that the patent was ever returned to Washington. Moreover, although the patent might have
been delivered to Mitchell orsomeone else, the lowercourt opinion inPennoyerv. Neffsuggests that at the
time of that litigation, Neff was in possession of, andproduced, the actual patent. SeeNeffv. Pennoyer, 17
F. Cas. at 1280.
485
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Under Oregon law, to secure execution one had to obtain a writ of
execution and post and publish notice for four weeks. 49 All of the steps were
apparently taken. 50 On August 7, 1866, the property was sold at a sheriff's
auction for $341.60.51 Notably, the buyer was not Sylvester Pennoyer, as
the Supreme Court opinion 52 and commentators have implied. 53 The prop-
erty was purchased by none other than J.H. Mitchell, who three days later
assigned the property to Sylvester Pennoyer. 54 Pennoyer had much in
common with Mitchell. He, like Mitchell, was a Portland lawyer, involved
in politics, 55 and active in real estate speculation. 56 There is no evidence
available on whether Pennoyer had actual knowledge of, or connection to,
the original action, though it is certainly possible. 57 Moreover, since he
took title through Mitchell, it is not clear that he should have been treated as
a true innocent third party purchaser.58
It appears that for the next eight years Pennoyer peacefully minded his
own business, doing those things one would expect of any property
owner-he paid the taxes, cut some timber, and sold a small portion of the
land. 59 The peace was broken in 1874 when Neff reappeared on the scene.
The evidence suggests that Neff began making trouble for Pennoyer several
49. See OR. CODE CIV. P. §§ 271,288(2).
50. Deady's statement of the case says that the property was sold following an order of execution.
Neff v. Pennoyer, 17 F. Cas. at 1280.
51. See id.
52. Justice Hunt in his dissent states that "the land in question ... was bought by the defendant
Pennoyer, at a sale upon the judgment in such suit." 95 U.S. at 736 (Hunt, J., dissenting). Justice Field
does not dispute this statement by Hunt, though his own description of the events is somewhat more
ambiguous-he merely states that the "defendant claims to have acquired the premises under a sheriff's
deed." Id. at 719; see also id. at 746 (Hunt, J., dissenting).
53. See, e.g., J. FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE 100 (1985); Drobak, The
Federalism Theme in Personal Jurisdiction, 68 IOWA L. REV. 1015, 1026 (1983); Lewis, supra note 45, at
772; Silberman, supra note 6, at 44 n.53.
54. See Neff v. Pennoyer, 17 F. Cas. at 1280. There is no evidence available concerning the amount
Pennoyer paid Mitchell for the assignment. See Supreme Court Transcript of Record at 6, Pennoyer v.
Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877) (stating that the assignment from Mitchell to Pennoyer was "for value re-
ceived"). In his answer in a related lawsuit, see infra notes 67-69 and accompanying text, Pennoyerstated
that the assignment was made "for a valuable consideration." Answer at 3, Neff v. Pennoyer, No. 222
(C.C. Or. 1875).
55. Mitchell and Pennoyer were from different political parties-Mitchell was a Republican, Pen-
noyer a Democrat.
56. See VII (Part 2) DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 445 (D. Malone ed., 1964).
57. Pennoyer may, of course, have been an innocent dupe. As one observer commented, "He was a
prey to evil men." E. MACCOLL, supra note 29, at 214 n.
58. See C. SMITH & R. BOYER, SURVEY OF THE LAw OF PROPERTY 479 (2d ed. 1971) (basic common
law rule is that one cannot pass a better title than that which he has; similarly, a purchaser can acquire no
better title than that of his vendor).
59. See Neff v. Pennoyer, 17 F. Cas. 1291 (C.C.D. Or. 1875) (No. 10,085); McGuire v. Neff, No. 237
(C.C.D. Or. 1875), reprinted in Morning Oregonian, Dec. 7, 1875, at 1, col. 6 (plaintiff, who had
purchased a portion of land from Pennoyer, sought to quiet title).
486
Vol 62:479, 1987
Pennoyer Reconsidered
months before he actually filed suit, because in July of 1874 Pennoyer
began taking steps to protect the validity of his title. It seems that local
officials had been somewhat lax in the matter of title when the property was
originally sold at the sheriff's auction. The sheriff's deed was not signed
until five months after the sale, and then it was signed by the deputy sheriff,
not the sheriff.60 In an apparent effort to insure that this carelessness was
not the basis for an attack on his title, Pennoyer obtained the signature of the
then current sheriff on a second deed dated July 21, 1874.61 Not taking any
chances-, three days later he acquired still a third deed, this one signed by
the man who had been sheriff at the time of the sale.62 But all the
precautions were for naught; ultimately, Pennoyer was evicted.
The case of Neff v. Pennoyer was filed in federal court on September 10,
1874,63 and the ensuing battle confirms that vindictive and protracted
litigation is not a recent phenomenon. Neff apparently had prospered in
California. He had settled in San Joaquin with a wife and family, as well as
servants, property, and livestock.64 He was prepared, however, to leave his
home in California and move himself, his wife, and his daughter to Oregon
for a year to pursue his various legal actions. 65
The opening salvo between Neff and Pennoyer was fired when Neff sued
to evict Pennoyer, but the war did not end there. After Pennoyer lost the
eviction suit, and costs were awarded against him, he battled bitterly over
the amount of those costs. 66 Neff was again the winner, and adding insult to
injury, he proceeded to sue Pennoyer again-this time to recover money
damages sustained as a result of Pennoyer cutting down timber on the
property.67 Pennoyer counterclaimed to collect property taxes that he had
paid from 1866 to 1875.68 The counterclaim was dismissed and Pennoyer's
defense of the damage action proved to be the closest that he got to a
victory: the jury found for Neff but awarded only nominal damages. 69
60. Neff v. Pennoyer, 17 F. Cas. at 1280.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Supreme Court Transcript of Record at 6, Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
64. SeeAffidavitofMarcusNefffiledAugust3l,1875,McGuirev. Neff, JudgmentNo. 255 (C.C.D.
Or. 1875).
65. See id.
66. Neff v. Pennoyer, 17 F. Cas. 1290 (C.C.D. Or. 1875) (No. 10,084).
67. Neff v. Pennoyer, 17 F. Cas. 1291 (C.C.D. Or. 1875) (No. 10,085).
68. Id.
69. Neff v. Pennoyer, Oregon Circuit Journal "A" at 819-20 (Jan. 18, 1876) (available in Seattle
Federal Archives and Records Center, GSA No. 21 USDC). The battle over the Neff homestead did not
end with the Pennoyer litigation. Enter one Mary Maguire who had purcfiased a portion of the land from
Pennoyer. She sued Neff in Oregon state court seeking to clear her title. McGuire v. Neff, No. 237
(Circuit Court of Oregon for Multnomah County, Complaint dated May 17, 1875). The case was
removed to federal court, a step which generated a flurry of affidavits and counteraffidavits about
487
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When the dust had settled, Pennoyer, whom the Supreme Court assumed
was a bona fide purchaser for value, was left holding the bag. Pennoyer had
purchased the land for "valuable consideration" and paid the taxes on it for
a number of years, yet he found himself evicted, with nothing to show for
his money and subject to suit for trespass for entering the land he thought he
owned. There is no evidence that Pennoyer did or could ever recover the loss
from anyone. 70
Following the litigation, Neff disappeared into obscurity; 71 not so Pen-
noyer and Mitchell. Pennoyer went on to be Governor of Oregon, 72 but he
remained bitter about his defeat in Pennoyer v. Neff Ten years after the
Supreme Court decision, in his inaugural address as governor, Pennoyer
decried that decision as a usurpation of state power.73 He remained a
whether there was diversity.
Curiously, in the battle over diversity, McGuire seems to have missed an obvious argument. Total
diversity, as outlined in Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806), presumably was required
to remove the McGuire case to federal court. Although Neff was a citizen of California, McGuire also
named Neff's attorneys (who had acquired a one-third interest in McGuire's land afterNeffv. Pennoyer)
as codefendants, and they were citizens of Oregon. This would have destroyed diversity and prevented
removal. Arguably, McGuire's claim against Neff was separate and severable from her claims against
the lawyers. See The Separable Controversy Act of 1866, ch. 288, 14 Stat. 306 (1866). However, given
that they held an undivided interest in the property whose title she was seeking to clear, this seems a
little doubtful. Whatever the basis or propriety of the removal, McGuire ultimately lost her claim in
federal court. See McGuire v. Neff, No. 237 (C.C.D. Or. 1875), reprinted in Morning Oregonian, Dec.
7, 1875, at 1, col. 6.
70. Pennoyer probably could not recover from Mitchell because it appears that Mitchell conveyed
by quit claim deed without warranties. See Assignment from Mitchell to Pennoyer, quoted in Neff v.
Pennoyer, stipulation (filed Sept. 21, 1874).
71. In an affidavit filed in the McGuire case, see supra note 42, Neff asserted that he was a citizen of
California, that he was in Oregon solely for the purpose of pursuing litigation, and that he did not intend
to remain in Oregon. Whether he in fact returned to California is unclear, but by 1880 he was back in (or
still in) Oregon and was listed along with his wife and two children in Multnomah County, Oregon in the
1880 census. Census of 1880, Multnomah County, Oregon at 213.
72. Pennoyer served two terms as governor, followed by one term as Mayor of Portland. See J.
GASTON, PORTLAND OREGON: ITS HISTORY AND BUILDERS 372-73 (1911). He was something of a
maverick as a politician, and was described by former Attorney General Williams as a "political freak,"
E. MAcCOLL, supra note 29, at 210, and by the Morning Oregonian as "peculiar, eccentric, and
demagogic," Morning Oregonian, May 19, 1890, at6, col. 1; see VII (Part 2) DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN
BIOGRAPHY 445-46 (D. Malone ed., 1964). The Morning Oregonian was no fan of Pennoyer. In an
editorial, it said of him: "On all large public questions throughout his life he has been conspicuously,
absurdly wrong. . . .We do not say that Mr. Pennoyer never deviates into sense. Doubtless he does, at
times-when the subject is one of no particular or public importance; but they who have known him
longest never knew him to entertain sound opinions on any important public question." Morning
Oregonian, May 19, 1890, at 6, cols. 1-2. In a characteristic demonstration of his independence,
Governor Pennoyer proclaimed Oregon's Thanksgiving holiday to be one week later than the date set by
President Cleveland. See id.; E. MACCOLL, supra note 29, at 210.
73. Inaugural address of Governor Sylvester Pennoyer to the Legislative assembly of the State of
Oregon 28 (1887). This speech was viewed as something of an embarrassment, at least by some. See 2
DEADY DIARY, supra note 22, at 5 10 (diary entry Jan. 15, 1887). The Oregonian published a satire of the
speech in which Pennoyer is quoted as saying:
Some years ago I had a lawsuit with Mr. Neff. It was in the federal courts and finally in the supreme
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vociferous critic of the Supreme Court, urging at one point that the entire
Court should be impeached, explaining: "We have during this time been
living under a government not based upon the Federal Constitution, but
under one created by the plausible sophistries of John Marshall. . . . Our
constitutional government has been supplanted by a judicial oligarchy." 74
Mitchell also remained in the public eye. He was elected to the United
States Senate in 1872, lost his senate seat in 1879, but was reelected in
1885.75 By modem standards, Mitchell's reelection is quite extraordinary.
Shortly before the 1885 election, Judge Deady, the lower court judge in
Pennoyer v. Neff, came into possession of a set of love letters which Mitchell
had written to Mitchell's second wife's younger sister during the five years
that he carried on an affair with her.76 Deady turned the love letters over to a
newspaper, the Oregonian,77 an outspoken critic of Mitchell. The Ore-
gonian willingly published the letters for all to read and enjoy.78 Despite the
scandal, Mitchell was elected four days later, something which Deady called
"a disgrace to the state and a reproach to humanity. ",79
Scandal was a way of life for Mitchell. In 1905 he, along with a number
of other prominent Oregon officials, was indicted in connection with a
massive land fraud scheme. 80 The scheme was a simple one. Following the
Donation Act, Congress had passed the Homestead Act of 1862 and the
Timber and Stone Act of 1878, all of which offered small tracts of land to
court of the United States and was decided against me. I have carefully examined the federal
constitution, and I do not find there any authority delegated to the federal government to decide a
case against me. That decision was, therefore, a clear usurpation. That soured me on federal
courts.
Morning Oregonian, Jan. 22, 1887, at 4, col. 3.
74. 3 C. WARREN, THE SUPREME CotRT IN UNrrED STATES HISTORY 425 (19241 (quoting Pennoyer).
Pennoyer's dislike of the Supreme Court apparently was expressed often and became known as
"Pennoyerism." See T. GREER, F=TY YEARS IN OREGON: EXPERIENCES, OBSERVATIONS AND COMMEN-
TARIES UPON MEAN, MEASURES AND CUSTOMS IN PIONEER TIMES AND LATER 331-32 (1912). Pennoyer
was not, however, entirely consistent in his view that the federal courts lacked jurisdiction to invalidate
state laws. The Morning Oregonian reported that when the Supreme Court "issued an injunction that
prevented for a time the erection of a bridge over the Willamette River below his sawmill, he came
forward with congratulations on the courage and spirit of a court that would assume jurisdiction and
overthrow a state law that he did not want." Morning Oregonian, May 19, 1890, at 6, col. 2.
75. Morning Oregonian, Nov. 19, 1885, at 1, col. 6.
76. 2 DEADY DIARY, supra note 22, at 417 (diary entry July 28,1883), 435-36 (Appendix A, 1883).
77. Id. at 480 (diary entry Nov. 14, 1885), 435-36 (Appendix A, 1883).
78. Morning Oregonian, Nov. 14, 1885, at 2, cols. 1-4. The Oregonian was so outraged by
Mitchell's behavior that it published letters with the hope that Mitchell would sue for libel, and thus
further expose his sordid past. Mitchell was not to be caught in that trap, however, and simply denied the
allegations and claimed that the letters were fraudulent. See Morning Oregonian, Nov. 16, 1885, at 4,
cols. 1-5.
79. 2 DEADY DIARY, supra note 22, at 480 (diary entry Dec. 21, 1885). The day before the election,
Deady predicted that the letters would not change the result, observing that Mitchell "is alone in
making fornication a means of salvation." Id. (diary entry Dec. 14, 1885).
80. See Messing, supra note 17.
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individual settlers. Aspiring lumber barons, trying to assemble large tracts
of land, transported huge numbers of settlers to land offices to file dummy
applications. With a few well placed bribes, the applications would be
approved and the settlers would then transfer their deeds in exchange for a
modest payoff.81 In July of 1905, while still serving in the United States
Senate, Mitchell was convicted and sentenced to six months in jail, a
$1,000 fine, and complete disbarment from public office.82 In December of
that same year, while his appeal was pending, Mitchell died, apparently
from complications following a tooth extraction. 83 The Daily Oregon
Statesman reported that the Senate adjourned without any official recogni-
tion of Mitchell's death, though the chaplain "recalled the situation to mind
in his prayer by referring pointedly to corruption and death and by praying
that the members of the senate might be given strength to bear each other's
burdens."84 Possibly moved by the chaplain's prayer, the Senate later
passed a resolution to pay Mitchell's funeral expenses.85
This fraudulent scheme is interesting not only because it was the last and
among the most public of the scandals that had become a way of life for
Mitchell, but also because the nature of the scheme itself raises a nagging,
though unanswerable question: Were the initial transactions between Neff
and Mitchell part of an aborted fraudulent arrangement? One can only
wonder. 86
II. THE COURTS' HANDLING OF THE CASE
A. Judge Deady's Approach
The lower court opinion, written by Judge Matthew Deady, 87 merits
81. See E. MACCOLL, supra note 29, at 288-98.
82. See Daily Oregon Statesman, July 4, 1905, at 1, col. 3; Messing, supra note 17, at 56.
83. See Daily Oregon Statesman, Dec. 9, 1905, at 5, col. 1; Messing, supra note 17, at 56.
84. Daily Oregon Statesman, Dec. 12, 1905, at 1, col. 3. The paper further observed that this was
"the first time the death of a senator was permitted to pass unnoticed by the senate."
85. 40 CONG. REC. 1738 (1906).
86. Information concerning this fraudulent scheme also raises another intriguing though unprova-
ble possibility. It was not uncommon for bribes to be paid to officials in connection with the processing
of land claims. See Messing, supra note 17, at 36. If it was in connection with his land claim that Neff
consulted Mitchell, one wonders whether the dispute between Mitchell and Neff was about the
reimbursement of bribe money paid by Mitchell to secure Neff's patent.
87. Mitchell was not the only one who had problems with his name. See supra note 28. In 1853,
Deady was appointed to the territorial bench of Oregon. Inexplicably, his commission was issued in the
name of "Mordecai Paul Deady" instead of Matthew Paul Deady. The reason for the error remains
unclear, see M. CLARK, EDEN SEEKERS 265-66 (1981), but when word of the errorreached Washington,
President Pierce withdrew his nomination of Deady and repaid a political debt by appointing Odadiah
B. McFadden. Ultimately, McFadden was transferred to the newly-created Washington territory and
Deady was reappointed under the correct name. See W. WOODWARD, THE RISE AND EARLY HISTORY OF
POLITICAL PARTIES IN OREGON, 1843-1868, at 76-77 (1913).
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closer scrutiny than it has received. Judge Deady, like the Supreme Court,
found for Neff, but his rationale was more limited in scope. Deady's
opinion is interesting, not only because the approach is strikingly modem,
but also because it provides a useful counterpoint to the Supreme Court
opinion. The Supreme Court affirmed Judge Deady, but on the basis of a
different and much broader rationale. The fact that Justice Field chose to
reject a more narrow approach which would have achieved the same result
may suggest that he was less concerned with the particular case before him
and more concerned with creating precedent.
Deady's opinion is long, careful, and quite conservative in approach. His
analysis was limited to the question whether there was quasi-in-remjurisdic-
tion. He did not discuss whether there could have been in personamjurisdic-
tion because, as he noted, all the parties agreed that there was no in personam
jurisdiction.88 His approach is based solely on state statutory construction,
an area in which Deady was particularly knowledgeable since it was he who
drafted the Oregon Code. 89 Although he acknowledged that "it is the duty of
the state to deal justly and considerately with nonresidents who have prop-
erty within her jurisdiction," he concluded that matters pertaining to the
"mode of proceeding" are within the "absolute control" of the state. 90
Deady considered three specific objections to the original proceeding: (1)
the order of publication was made without sufficient evidence that Mitchell
had a cause of action against Neff;91 (2) Mitchell's affidavit was inadequate
because it did not describe what diligence had been used to ascertain Neff's
place of residence; 92 and (3) the affidavit was made by the editor of the
newspaper rather than by the "printer" as required by the statute. 93
Deady rejected the first argument. He noted that the only evidence for
Mitchell's valid cause of action against Neff was the verified complaint
itself and that "it is questionable whether even the complaint states facts
sufficient to prove the existence of a cause of action. ",94 He concluded,
88. Neff, 17 R Cas. at 1280-81. The Oregon statute extended in personam jurisdiction only to
persons who appeared in court, were "found within the state," or were a "resident thereof." OR. CODE
Civ. P. § 506; see 17 F. Cas. at 1281.
89. Deady drafted in 1862 the Oregon Code of Civil Procedure, along with its 1874 revisions. See
Beardsley, Code Making in Early Oregon, 23 OR. L. REv. 22, 49-53 (1943); Peters, The "First"
Oregon Code: Another Look at Deady's Role, 82 OR. HisT. Q. 383 (1981).
90. Neff, 17 F. Cas. at 1282.
91. Id. at 1284.
92. Id. at 1286.
93. Id. at 1287.
94. Id. at 1286. He further observed that, "Concerning the material circumstances of time, place
and amount, this affidavit is wholly silent, and whether this supposed cause of action arose upon an
indebtedness of one mill for a small measure of moonshine or a million of dollars for as many miles of
land, is left to conjecture." Id. at 1285.
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however, that there was sufficient evidence to insulate the original judg-
ment from a collateral attack. 95
Although Deady presumed from the record that Mitchell had a valid
cause of action, he accepted the other two arguments concerning notice.
His conclusion that the newspaper editor's affidavit did not meet the
statutory requirement of a "printer's" affidavit might be dismissed as an
overly literal reading of the statute.96 Nevertheless, his construction of the
provisions relevant to Mitchell's affidavit seems quite sensible. The Oregon
statutes provided for service by publication when "the defendant after due
diligence cannot be found within the state."' 97 In addition, the Code
mandated that in case of publication the court shall also direct a copy of the
summons and complaint to be mailed to the defendant at his place of
residence, "unless it shall appear that such residence is neither known to
the party making the application, nor can with reasonable diligence be
ascertained by him." 98 Pursuant to these provisions, Mitchell had filed an
affidavit stating that Neff "is a nonresident of this state; that he resides
somewhere in the State of California, at what place affiant knows not. "99
Mitchell's affidavit, however, had given no indication of what steps, if any,
Mitchell had taken to locate Neff. 100 Construing the two relevant Oregon
provisions together, Deady concluded that evidence of diligence in at-
tempting to locate the defendant must appear in the affidavit. '01 He noted
that the law was not intended to be "a means of spoiling nonresidents" and
that the statutory scheme was designed to ensure that defendants got notice
"if possible."'1 2 Deady recognized that a nonresident defendant was un-
likely to get actual notice when service is by mere publication. 103 More-
over, the likelihood of actual notice is particularly small when, as in this
case, the notice is published "in a weekly newspaper of denominational
circulation within the state, and practically none without it.''104 Deady
concluded that because this statutory scheme was designed to ensure that
defendant get notice "if possible," it was critical that the plaintiff's
affidavit demonstrate that diligence was used in the attempt to locate the
defendant.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 1287-88.
97. OR. CODE CIV. P. § 55.
98. Id. § 56.
99. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 717 (1877) (quoting Mitchell's affidavit).
100. See Transcript of Record at 7, Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
101. Neff 17 F. Cas. at 1287.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
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Deady's analysis of state law proved well founded, 105 and was consistent
with contemporaneous treatises,10 6 and the approach other states had
taken.107 In addition, a fair reading of a prior United States Supreme Court
case suggests that failure to comply with such statutory requirements was a
basis for a collateral attack. The case, Galpin v. Page, ' 08 written by none
other than Justice Field, held that where service on a nonresident is by
publication, a judgment may be collaterally attacked and invalidated where
there has been a failure to comply literally with the statutory requirements
for service. 109 While Galpin permitted a collateral attack to determine
whether there had been compliance with statutory requirements, Field
nowhere suggested that the prior judgment might be struck down where
those statutory requirements in fact had been met.'10
105. Subsequent Oregon decisions confirmed Deady's view that an adequate affidavit was a
statutory prerequisite to jurisdiction. See Goodale v. Coffee, 24 Or. 346,354,33 P. 990 (1893); see also
Odell v. Campbell, 9 Or. 298 (1881).
106. An 1873 treatise stated that "if the state requires certain steps to be taken as a prerequisite to
jurisdiction, then a deficiency in respect thereto cannot be supplied by intendment or presumptions of
law." D. RoPtEt, A TRETisE ON THE LAW OF JUDICIAL AND ExEcUrIoN SALES § 47 (1873).
107. The California and Iowa Supreme Courts had upheld collateral attacks on judgments where
the publication and notice requirements were not complied with literally. Townsend v. Tallant, 33 Cal.
45 (1867); McGahen v. Carr, 6 Iowa 330 (1858); Ehrenzweig & Mills, Personal Service Outside the
State, 41 CALIF. L. Ray. 383, 385 & n.17 (1953). The Iowa decision is particularly interesting. Iowa's
statute requiring publication and the mailing of notice was almost identical to Oregon's. The defendant
to the original action who had lost by default alleged that notice had not in fact been mailed to him. The
court sustained this collateral attack.
108. 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 350 (1873). Galpin was discussed in Deady's opinion, Neff, 17 F. Cas. at
1283, and also in the briefs submitted to the Supreme Court. Field did not address that case at all,
although Justice Hunt, in dissent, noted that Galpin "is cited in hostility to the views I have expressed."
Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 743. Professor Hazard, in his article on Pennoyer, suggests that the statement by
Hunt indicates that there must have been an earlier version of Field's opinion which did cite Galpin.
Hazard, A General Theory of State-Court Jurisdiction, 1965 Sup. Cr. REv. 241, 263 n.78. It seems
equally possible that Hunt's comments on Galpin were directed at the parties, who discussed and relied
on that case.
109. As Field stated in Galpin, "When, therefore, by legislation of a State constructive service of
process by publication is substituted in place of personal citation, and the court upon such service is
authorized to proceed against the person of an absent party, not a citizen of the State nor found within it,
every principle of justice exacts a strict and literal compliance with the statutory provisions." 85 U.S.
(18 Wall.) at 369. Despite Galpin, the Court in Pennoyer held that the affidavit could not be collaterally
attacked. Justice Field may have had some reservations about this portion of the opinion since he notes
that as to this issue there was "some difference of opinion among the members of this court." Pennoyer,
95 U.S. at 721. If Field had doubts about the majority's resolution of this issue, those doubts would
seem to be well founded. The result of the majority's ruling is that if a judge accepts as adequate an
affidavit which is clearly inadequate and, as a result, the defendant gets no notice, the defendant can
attack that affidavit only by appealing the decision as to which he had no notice.
110. In Galpin, just as in Pennoyer, Field cites Justice Story for the proposition that no sovereign
can extend its process beyond its own territorial limits. 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) at 367. In Galpin, however,
Field uses Story for the more limited proposition that where the record shows the defendant was outside
the state at the time of service, the presumption of jurisdiction is eliminated. Field explained that
"where the special powers conferred are exercised in a special manner, not according to the course of
the common law, or where the general powers of the court are exercised over a class not within its
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Throughout his opinion, including the discussion of Mitchell's affidavit,
Deady gives no indication of who Mitchell was or what his reputation for
honesty was. Nonetheless, one suspects that Deady's holding concerning
the requirements for the affidavits may have been influenced by his knowl-
edge of Mitchell."1  In Deady's analysis of the need for a more detailed
affidavit, one gets the sense Deady believed that in this case the defect was
no technical failure and that it was likely Mitchell had not used the requisite
diligence. Deady notes that the original court order directing service by
publication was made "without any evidence that the plaintiff [Mitchell]
had ever used any diligence to ascertain such place of residence, or even
that he was not conveniently and intentionally ignorant of the fact. "112 The
suggestion that Mitchell might have ignored the statutory requirement of
diligence or that he might have been "conveniently and intentionally
ignorant" of the facts is certainly consistent with Deady's low opinion of
Mitchell.
There is no question that by the time of Neff v. Pennoyer, Deady knew of
Mitchell's lack of scruples. 113 Deady was not only a distinguished jurist and
long time resident of Oregon, he was also an acute observer of life and
politics in Oregon. 114 He kept extensive diaries in which he referred to the
events and prominent people of the day. By the time Neff v. Pennoyer arose,
Mitchell's prior activities in Pennsylvania and his bigamous marriage had
received wide public attention in Oregon and Deady had closely followed
the scandal. 115 By June of 1873, Deady thought all of the scandals would be
ordinary jurisdiction upon the performance of prescribed conditions, no such presumption of jurisdic-
tion will attend the judgment of the court." Id. at 371. In that case, California sought to exercise
jurisdiction over a nonresident through service by publication. Field gave no indication that the state
lacked the authority to do this. He simply held that because this exercise of jurisdiction was "not
according to the course of common law" that the statutory requirements must be strictly complied with.
111. Deady also knew Pennoyer-he is referred to from time to time in Deady's diary. While there
is no indication that Deady held Pennoyer in the same contempt he held Mitchell, there are indications
that he did not hold Pennoyer in particularly high regard. Not long after he decided Neff v. Pennoyer
Deady speculates that a piece of doggerel apparently critical of Deady was probably the work of
Pennoyer. I DEADY DIARY, supra note 22, at 191 (diary entry May 9, 1875). In January 1887, Deady says
of Pennoyer's inaugural address: "He has made a laughing stock of himself as I knew he would if
elected." 2 id. at 510 (diary entry Jan. 15, 1887). See supra note 74. Later, in his diaries, Deady refers to
Pennoyer as "Silpester Annoyer," id. at 551 (diary entry Feb. 23, 1889), and a "Jacobin." Id. at 558
(diary entry August 10, 1889).
112. Neff 17 F. Cas. at 1287.
113. See, e.g., 1 DEADY DIARY, supra note 22, at 128 (diary entry June 7, 1873), 142 (diary entry
Dec. 8, 1873), 182 (diary entry Jan. 2, 1875). In 1873, Deady was presented with a petition against
Mitchell. Deady indicated that had he not been on the bench he would have signed it. Id. at 143 (diary
entry Dec. 18, 1873).
114. As one historian has observed, "Deady's personal correspondence reveals a cutting wit, a
cynical view of human nature and of the political process, and a robust interest in the dynamics of life
about him." Peters, supra note 89, at 392.
115. See I DEADY DIARY, supra note 22, at 129 (diary entry June 9, 1873).
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the end of Mitchell. As he explained: "I think he [Mitchell] must go down.
Seduction, desertion, theft, clandestine change of name and absconding
and bigamy are too much for a man to carry in the Senate, though he is
making a desparate [sic] fight of it." 116 Mitchell nonetheless survived and
even flourished. As time went by, Deady's diary entries displayed an
increasing contempt for the man. 117 After 1873, Deady generally referred
to Mitchell by his born name, Hipple. On election day in 1876 Deady stated
in disgust: "Have not voted for Congressmari since the Republicans put
Hipple in the platform in 1873 and don't think I will until they take him out
"118
Deady also had further reason to doubt Mitchell's integrity. In 1873,
allegations of bribery by Mitchell and others surfaced in connection with a
Senate election. 119 Deady recorded in his diary that Ben Holliday, a
political ally of Mitchell's had reportedly spent $20,000 in bribes in order
to buy the votes necessary to ensure Mitchell's election. 120 Deady, along
with the United States Attorney in Oregon, pushed for a prompt and
thorough investigation of the matter. When one grand jury refused to return
an indictment Deady ordered a new grand jury. 121 It looked like indict-
ments might be returned until Mitchell managed to use further bribery to
bring the investigation to a halt. The Attorney General at that time, George
H. Williams, also from Oregon, had recently been nominated to the United
States Supreme Court but his confirmation was in doubt. Senator Mitchell
approached Williams and offered to vote for confirmation if in exchange
Williams would halt the grand jury. Williams agreed and ordered the
Oregon United States Attorney to drop the matter. When he refused,
116. Id. at 128 (diary entry June 7, 1873).
117. See, e.g., id. at 127-29 (diary entries May 31 to June 9, 1873), 142 (diary entry Dec. 8, 1873),
220 (diary entry Nov. 7, 1876), 222 (diary entry Dec. 18, 1876); 2 id. at400 (diary entry Aug. 26, 1882),
468 (diary entry June 6, 1885). with characteristically biting wit, Deady commented frequently on
Mitchell's romantic activities. In one entry, Deady mentions Mitchell's early exit from a party they had
both attended and notes: "Of course some evil minded persons will be found to say that M[itchell]
preferred to spend the time with his hostess upstairs .... "Id. at 524 (diary entry Oct. 15, 1887). In
another place Deady compares Mitchell with William Kissane, another politician with a sordid past and
observes that "on the woman question M[itchell] is a long ways ahead, and some of the back counties of
Pennsylvania still to hear from . I... d  at 515 (diary entry April 23, 1887).
118. 1Id. at 220 (diary entry Nov. 7, 1876).
119. See id. at 154-55. This election was not the first in which allegations of voter fraud were raised
against Mitchell. Similar allegations surfaced in connection with Mitchell's unsuccessful 1866 bid for
the United States Senate. See L GASTON, supra note 31, at 666-67.
120. 1 DEtY Dt aRY, supra note 22, at 80 (diary entry May20,1872);see E. MACCOLL, supra note
29, at 40.
121. See I DEADY DIARY, supra note 22, at 155. Deady was under a great deal of pressure on this
matter and there apparently were threats to abolish his job or remove him from office. Id., at 134 (diary
entry Aug. 27, 1873); see id. at 154-55.
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Williams fired him. 122 Commenting on this incident, Deady called the
removal of the United States Attorney "[a]n atrocious act for which
W[illiams] & M[itchell] deserve severe punishment." 123
Thus, it is not at all surprising that Deady would focus on Mitchell's
affidavit. He viewed the case not in the global terms that Field did, but as a
battle between one plaintiff and one defendant under circumstances which
raised a high likelihood of fraud. He wrote an opinion of limited scope that
dealt with the particular injustice demonstrated by the facts of the case.
Though Deady's opinion remains obscure, it is strikingly modem in
approach. If Pennoyer v. Neff arose today, it is to Deady's approach that a
modern-day Neff would have looked for protection. The original suit
involved legal services rendered in Oregon by an Oregon lawyer to a client
then living in Oregon, and those legal services quite possibly concerned
land located in Oregon. All of this would unquestionably be sufficient to
constitute the "minimum contacts" necessary for the assertion of personal
jurisdiction over Neff. 124 Of course, a modern-day Neff would be entitled
to personal notice, but only if he could be found. 125 How would we protect a
modern-day Neff from a modern-day scoundrel like Mitchell who might
fraudulently assert that the defendant could not be found? By requiring, as
Deady required, an affidavit that specifically describes the steps that were
taken to locate the defendant.
B. Field's Approach
1. Field's Opinion
Field's opinion is very different from Deady's. Although Field was
undoubtedly familiar with at least some of the scandal concerning
Mitchell, 126 his focus was not on the affidavit or even the problem of
notice. 127 He dismissed rather summarily the rationale of the lower court
122. See id.; E. MACCOLL, supra note 29, at 203.
123. 1 DEADY DIARY, supra note 22, at 142 (diary entry Dec. 8, 1873). Williams did suffer some
punishment-he was never confirmed as Chief Justice, owing at least in part to this incident. See id. at
147 n.72.
124. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
125. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 317-18 (1950).
126. Stories about Mitchell and the scandal surrounding him had been published in the New York
Times and Washington Star, as well as in the Oregon papers. Field was from California, corresponded
regularly with Deady and sat circuit with Deady in Oregon. Field had been active in politics before his
appointment to the Supreme Court and remained politically active. The New York Times reported that
the scandal was widely publicized throughout the east coast. New York Times, June 14, 1873, at 2, col.
2. Thus, Field's knowledge of Mitchell's reputation seems likely.
127. Professor Hazard suggests that a major concern for Field was the notice problem. Hazard,
supra note 108, at 245; see also Drobak, supra note 53, at 1028. Nevertheless, Hazard notes, on the
notice issue the Pennoyer opinion is a disaster. Hazard, supra note 108, at 261-62, 270. As discussed
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and devoted the bulk of the opinion to matters which were not addressed by
the court below.
Field's opinion is somewhat disorganized, but the essential elements can
be easily summarized. First, although the opinion held that the defects in
the affidavits were not a basis for a collateral attack, 128 the Court nonethe-
less found ajurisdictional defect which invalidated the sale. 129 Specifically,
earlier, Deady's opinion is far more successful at dealing with the problem of notice than is Field's.
Field was not a man of weak intellect. Thus, one must suspect that his comments about notice did not in
fact reflect his primary concern, but were instead incidental. ,
128. Field notes some members of the Court disagree on this point. Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 721. See
supra note 109.
129. Field assumed, as did Deady, that if the original judgment was void for lack of jurisdiction,
then the execution on that judgment was necessarily also void. None of the parties argued to the
contrary and today it is generally asserted that if the underlying judgment is void, the execution of that
judgment is void and passes no title. See 30 AM. Jug. 2D Executions § 10 (1967); see also Lincoln-
Mercury-Phoenix, Inc. v. Base, 84 Ariz. 9, 322 P.2d 891, 894 (1958); City of Los Angeles v. Morgan,
105 Cal. App. 2d 726, 731,234 P.2d 319,322 (1951); Straw, Off-RecordRisksforBonaFide Purchasers
oflnterestsinRealProperty, 72 DICK. L. Rnv. 35,74-75 (1967); 33 C.LS. Executions § 299 (a) (1942).
Not self-evident, however, is the situation where the execution has been fully consummated and the
property passed to an innocent third party purchaser. In such a situation, it may not be proper to permit
the judgment debtor to recover the property, at least where steps were taken at the execution phase
which would be adequate to confer jurisdiction. If the court had proper jurisdiction at the execution
phase, then one could require the defendant to raise at that time all objections to the execution, or to
waive those objections. This analysis is easiest to follow where enforcement is sought in a different state
than the state that originally rendered the judgment. In such a case, the enforcement is a separate
proceeding that requires an independent jurisdictional basis and the judgment debtor can defeat the
execution by successfully challenging the jurisdiction of the executing state. See R. CASAD, JUISDIC-
TION IN CivIi AcTIONS T 6.02[2][a] (1983) and cases cited therein. Given the rule that the last judgment
is entitled to full faith and credit, see Treinies v. Sunshine Mining Co., 308 U.S. 66, 76-77 (1939), it
would seem quite appropriate to hold that where the enforcing forum had personal jurisdiction and the
judgment debtor failed to raise the invalidity of the underlying judgment, the enforcement of that
judgment was valid and could not be collaterally attacked. One might object that this analysis permits a
plaintiff to bootstrap an invalid judgment into a valid one. On closer examination, however, this
procedure does not seem at all unfair to the defendant. If, at the time of the execution, the court ordering
the execution has jurisdiction and the defendant receives notice and has a full opportunity to challenge
the validity of the prior judgment, then the defendant should not be permitted simply to stand by and
allow a bona fide purchaser to buy the land. See D. RoRER, supra note 106, § 1058 (an execution debtor
can not challenge the validity of an execution sale where the debtor has knowledge of the sale but
"silently stand[s] by and suffers others to purchase"). See generally Roosevelt Hardware v. Green, 72
A.D.2d 261, 424 N.Y.S.2d 276, 279 n.1 (App. Div. 1980) (stating that even where the underlying
judgment is void, the doctrine of laches might limit a judgment debtor's right to recover the property;
"purchasers at judicial sales are not subject to the arbitrary whims ofjudgment debtors who may seek to
recover their properties at any time").
This same analysis could be applied even where execution is in the same forum that rendered the
underlying judgment. If, at the time of the execution, the defendant were served in-state or if the court
took sufficient steps to confer quasi-in-rem jurisdiction (such as attaching the property and posting
notice, see Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 727), then one could argue that there was jurisdiction to execute the
judgment and the defendant had to come forward at that time with his objections or lose them.
Apparently, in Pennoyer those steps were taken at the execution phase which would be sufficient to
confer quasi-in-remjurisdiction. See supra text accompanying notes 49-50. While one might complain
that Neff had no actual notice of the execution, he had as much notice as Field thought a debtor was ever
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the Court held that quasi-in-rem jurisdiction was never acquired because
Neff's property in Oregon had not been attached at the beginning of the
litigation. 130 Field thought it self-evident that the property must be attached
at the beginning of the suit in order to secure quasi-in-rem jurisdiction. 131
Field did not cite any authority for this proposition and in fact a number of
states permitted quasi-in-rem jurisdiction without prior seizure. 1 32 Un-
daunted by a lack of authority, Field reasoned that attachment at the
beginning of the suit was necessary in order to prevent an unacceptable
uncertainty about the validity of thejudgment prior to the actual attachment
of the property. 133
The second aspect of the opinion is a discussion of why there was not in
personam jurisdiction-a completely unnecessary element of the opinion.
Having concluded that there was no quasi-in-rem jurisdiction the opinion
could have stopped there. As Deady noted, the Oregon Code did not permit
in personam jurisdiction over a nonresident, and both parties conceded that
the judgment was not binding in personam. 134 Field nonetheless proceeded
entitled to in any quasi-in-rem proceeding.
130. Deady had considered this argument and rejected it, concluding that if the defendant had
property in the state, then the state had the power to exercise quasi-in-rem jurisdiction and that the
timing of the attachment was "a matter for the state to determine." Neff 17 F. Cas. at 1281.
131. Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 728.
132. See, e.g., Cleland v. Tavernier, 11 Minn. 194 (1866); Eaton v. Badger, 33 N.H. 228 (1856);
Jarvis v. Barrett, 14 Wis. 591 (1861); Ehrenzweig, The Transient Rule of Personal Jurisdiction: The
"Power" Myth and Forum Conveniens, 65 YALE L.J. 289, 306 (1956); Fraser, Actions in Rem, 34
CORNELL L.Q. 29, 38-40 (1948); Hazard, supra note 108, at 269; Note, The Requirement of Seizure in
the Exercise of Quasi in Rem Jurisdiction: Pennoyer v. Neff Re-Examined, 63 HARV. L. REV. 657,
659-60 (1950); see also Cooper v. Reynolds, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 308,320 (1870) ("whether the writ [of
attachment] should have been issued simultaneously with the institution of the suit, or at some other
stage of its progress, cannot be a question of jurisdiction .... ").
133. Field's conclusion that prior attachment of the property is a necessary prerequisite to quasi-in-
rem jurisdiction is not well explained and it is on this point that Justice Hunt disagreed with the majority.
See Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 741-43 (Hunt, J., dissenting). The uncertainty which troubled Field is, of
course, an appropriate concern for plaintiffs who would not want to find in the middle of litigation that
they could no longer get a valid judgment. See Jarvis v. Barrett, 14 Wis. 591, 594, 596 (1861). That
certainty is also an appropriate concern for local authorities who might not want their courts to waste
time on cases which could later be terminated for lack of jurisdiction. What Field never explains is why
these concerns rise to the level of a constitutional infirmity. If the plaintiff and the local courts are
prepared to accept the uncertainty and wastefulness of potentially futile litigation, why should the
federal courts--or any other courts-care? Of course, the defendant may not want to waste his time on a
lawsuit that could turn out to be futile, but the defendant has complete control of the situation. So long as
the defendant retains property in the forum, the court will retain jurisdiction.
Possibly Field was concerned because he felt there was some question as to whether Neff actually
owned the land at the time of the first proceeding since Neff had not yet received his patent. However,
neither of the parties raised this issue and, by the time the case got to the Supreme Court, Oregon had
held that a settler who had fulfilled all of the prerequisites for issuance of the patent was a full owner of
the land whether or not he had received the actual patent. See Dolph v. Barney, 5 Or. 191,204 (1874);
see supra note 45.
134. Neff 17 F. Cas. at 1280-81.
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to discuss at length the circumstances under which in personam jurisdiction
could be exercised.135 Field held that in personam jurisdiction was proper
only where the defendant was served with process within the state, volun-
tarily appeared, or otherwise consented to jurisdiction. 136 This position
was not as universally accepted as Field suggested. 137 Not only was there
contrary authority in other countries, 138 but the statutes of New York and
California, the two states with whose laws Field surely would have been
familiar, appeared to authorize in personam jurisdiction without in-state
service. 139
Field's final and most startling step was to introduce the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment into his jurisdictional analysis. 140 This
step was unnecessary and surprising for several reasons. First, that clause
had not been raised or argued by either party or by the court below. Second,
Field had already concluded that the federal courts were not required to
(and hence would not) enforce the prior Oregon judgment.14 1 Third, the
due process discussion was dictum for the additional reason that the
135. Much of Field's discussion ofjurisdiction can be traced to Neff's brief. Although Pennoyer's
argument was based solely on the theory that the court had in ren jurisdiction, Neff's attorneys devoted
the majority of their brief to discussing when in personam jurisdiction could be exercised. Neff's brief
was the one that introduced concepts drawn from international law and that quoted Justice Story for the
proposition that "[n]o sovereign can extend its process beyond its own territorial limits." Respondent's
Brief at 2-3, Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877). Of course, because Pennoyer did not assert that there
was in personam jurisdiction, his brief did not dispute or analyze any of Neff's assertions on this
subject.
136. Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 729, 735.
137. See id. at 722 (discussing "two well-established principles of public law" concerning
jurisdiction).
138. For example, Article 14 of the French Code Napoleon of 1804 provided: "An alien, though not
residing in France, can be cited before the French courts, for the performance of obligations contracted
by him in France with a Frenchman; he can be brought before French courts for obligations contracted
by him in a foreign country toward Frenchmen." See de Vries & Lowenfeld, Jurisdiction in Personal
Actions-A Comparison of Civil Law Views, 44 IOWA L. REv. 306, 317 (1959) (quoting Code); see
Casad, Shaffer v. Heitner.An End to Ambivalence in Jurisdiction Theory?, 26 KAN. L. Rnv. 61(1977);
Ehrenzweig, supra note 132, at 289 n.3,299,308; Rheinstein, The ConstitutionalBases ofJurisdiction,
22 U. CHn. L. REv. 775, 797-99 (1955); Note, Jurisdiction Over Non-residents in PersonalActions, 5
COLuM. L. REv. 436 (1905).
139. 1851 Practice Actof California, Calif. Stats. 1851, titlellI, ch.5, §§ 30,31; NewYorkCode of
Procedure § 114 (1848); see Ehrenzweig & Mills, supra note 107, at 384 n.10. Field was the primary
drafter of the California Civil Practice Act, see C. SwIsHER, STEPHEN J. FIELD: CRAFTSMAN OF THE LAW
54 (1963), and based that act on the New York Code which was drafted by his brother, David Dudley
Field. See id.; W. Goedecke, Rights, Interests, and the Constitution: The Jurisprudence of Mr. Justice
Stephen Johnson Field 59 n.2 (1958) (Ph.D. dissertation, Univ. of Chicago); see also Pound, David
Dudley Field: An Appraisal, in DAVID DUDLEY FIELD CENTENARY ESSAYS 8-10 (A. Reppy ed. 1949).
140. Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 733.
141. Id. at 732-33.
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fourteenth amendment did not exist at the relevant time.142 Finally, the
specific due process "holding" of the case-that a judgment rendered
without personal jurisdiction is unenforceable even in the rendering
forum-has been viewed by at least some courts and commentators as itself
quite novel. 143
In some ways, the actual result in Pennoyer is a surprising one, at least
coming from Field. Field was a vigorous defender of private property and in
other opinions he had been far more sensitive to the problem of disturbing
title once it has fallen to a bona fide purchaser for value. 144 The result of
Pennoyer was to unsettle title to property. Under the facts of the case, at
142. Most commentators have focused on the fact that the fourteenth amendment was not in
existence at the time of the original judgment in Mitchell v. Neff. See, e.g., Lewis, supra note 45, at 773
n.20; Whitten, The Constitutional Limitations on State-Court Jurisdiction: A Historical-Interpretative
Reexamination of the Full Faith and Credit and Due Process Clauses ((pt. 1)), 14 CREIGHTON L. REV.
499, 504-05 (1981). However, given Field's analysis of the fourteenth amendment, the relevant question
is not whether the due process clause existed at the time of the original judgment, but whether it existed
at the time of the enforcement proceeding. This is so, because, as explained infra in the text
accompanying notes 172-174, Field does not rely on the clause as the source of the criteria for
determining the validity of the original judgment but simply as the reason for refusing to enforce the
judgment. Thus, the fourteenth amendment could be relied on so long as it was in existence at the time
of the enforcement proceeding. Although the fourteenth amendment did not exist at the time of the
sheriff's sale, it did exist at the time of Neff's ejectment action. Even focusing on the ejectment action,
however, the discussion of the fourteenth amendment is still dictum because that proceeding was
brought in federal court, not in state court, and the actions of a federal court would not be limited by the
fourteenth amendment (though the due process clause of the fifth amendment might be relevant). For a
discussion of the differences between the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments, see R. CASAD, supra
note 129, 5.01; Clermont, Restating Territorial Jurisdiction and Venue for State and Federal Courts,
66 CORNELL L. REv. 411, 434-36 (1981); Note, Fifth Amendment Due Process Limitations on
Nationwide Federal Jurisdiction, 61 B.U.L. REv. 403 (1981).
143. See, e.g., De La Montanya v. De La Montanya, 112 Cal. 101, 121-22, 44 P. 345, 350 (1896)
(McFarland, J., dissenting); FREEMAN ON JUDGMENTS § 567 (3d ed. 1881); Whitten, The Constitutional
Limitations on State-Court Jurisdiction: A Historical-Interpretative Reexamination of the Full Faith
and Credit and Due Process Clauses (Part Two), 14 CREIGHTON L. REv. 735, 822-28 (1981); see also
Note, supra note 138. Even after Pennoyer, the Supreme Court continued to express some uncertainty
on this point. In Hart v. Sansom, 110 U.S. 151 (1884), a nonresident defendant was served by
publication in a manner prescribed by state statute. Although the Court held that federal courts were not
bound by the prior judgment because the defendant was not served in person within the state, the Court
observed that "[t]he courts of the State [which rendered the judgment] might, perhaps, feel bound to
give effect to the service made as directed by its statutes." Id. at 155.
144. In Galpin v. Page, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 350 (1874), for example, Field held that under the
circumstances of that case, a judicial sale of property based on a judgment rendered without personal
jurisdiction passed no title. He noted, however, that there is a well established exception where the sale
is to a "stranger bona fide." Id. at 375 (quoting Gott v. Powell, 41 Mo. 416,420 (1867)). In Galpin, the
sale was to one of the attorneys for the original plaintiff, not to a stranger bonafide. See also Cooper v.
Reynolds, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 308, 321 (1870) (expressing concern about "unsettl[ing] titles to vast
amounts of property"). In the somewhat different context of the Sinking Fund Cases, 99 U.S. 700
(1879), Field expressed a similar concern. There, the Court upheld a federal law requiring the railroads
to establish a sinking fund for payment of debts due the federal government. Field, dissenting,
expressed alarm that the decision would "tend to create insecurity in the title to corporate property in the
country." Id. at 750 (Field, J., dissenting).
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least as presumed by the Court, Pennoyer was a bona fide purchaser for
value who had purchased property at a sheriff's auction held pursuant to a
court order, paid valuable consideration to the state, and received a signed
deed. He had then gone about his business for years, paying taxes on the
land, selling off a portion and using the land as any landowner might. Ten
years after the sheriff's sale, this bona fide purchaser discovered that not
only did he not have title but he was subject to damages for trespass and
could not even recover the taxes paid on the true owner's behalf.
It is one thing to decide whether ajudgment should be enforced, but once
a judgment has been executed and we introduce bona fide purchasers, the
problem becomes much more complex. 145 Oregon dealt with the problem
of bona fide purchasers through a statutory scheme which gave the judg-
ment debtor a year after execution of the judgment to set aside the execu-
tion. 146 After a year, the debtor could not reclaim the property although he
might be able to recover against the original plaintiff. Such a system
preserves the rights of bona fide purchasers and the integrity and reliability
of a sheriff's deed, while giving the original debtor some opportunity to
undo any fraud. All of this was ignored by the Court.
The opinion in Pennoyer is commonly explained as being based on a
theory that state power is coextensive with physical power. 147 However,
both the facts of Pennoyer and Field's views expressed in other cases
concerning the limits of governmental authority1 48 suggest that he did not
believe that state power was coextensive with physical power. Under the
facts of the case, there can be no question that Oregon had the physical
power to enforce the judgment-it exercised that power when the sheriff
auctioned Neff's Oregon land. Moreover, the view that jurisdiction is
coextensive with physical power is flatly contrary to the fundamental
premise which Field labored much of his judicial career to establish-that
there are limits on the power of states irrespective of the existence of
145. As noted earlier, see supra note 52, the Supreme Court appears to have treated the case as if
Pennoyer were a bona fide purchaser who had purchased the land directly from the sheriff at the auction.
146. Section 57 of the Oregon Code of Civil Procedure allowed a defendant, if successful after
reopening his default judgment, to collect restitution as ordered by the court. Nonetheless, if the
property was sold upon execution to a purchaser in good faith, the title would remain with the purchaser,
despite the defendant's success.
147. See McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 91 (1917) ("[t]he foundation ofjurisdiction is physical
power"); R. CASAD, supra note 142, at 2-10.
148. See infra notes 155-61 and accompanying text.
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physical power. 149 Pennoyer, like so many of Field's decisions, 150 is not
about the physical limitations on state power, but about constitutional
limitations which restrict state authority notwithstanding the existence of
physical power. 151
The explanation as to why Justice Field was prepared to write an
elaborate exegesis, most of it dicta, the result of which was to unsettle title
to real estate, seems not to lie in some theory of physical power. Rather, the
explanation seems to lie in Field's discussion of the nonphysical limitations
on state power. The basic premise of the opinion is that there are limitations
on state power that are simply inherent in the nature of government. Having
described these limitations, Field then goes on to invoke the due process
clause as a mechanism to which the federal courts may turn to ensure that
states do not exceed the inherent limitations on their power. 152 When the
due process discussion of Pennoyer is viewed in the context of Field's other
opinions, it appears not as a chance afterthought, but as the primary point
149. See Bird, The Evolution of Due Process of Law in the Decisions of the United States Supreme
Court, 13 COLuNI. L. REv. 37, 42-43 (1913). Further, Field implies in Pennoyer that consent by the
defendant would be a basis for jurisdiction. Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 729. This suggests that not only is
physical power not a sufficient condition, it is not a necessary condition either.
150. See, e.g., Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678, 690-91 (1888) (Field, J., dissenting):
Butchers' Union Co. v. Crescent City Co., Ill U.S. 746, 759 (1884) (Field, J., concurring); Munn v.
Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 138 (1877) (Field, J., dissenting); Bartemeyer v. Iowa, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 129,
139-40 (1874) (Field, J., concurring); Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 83 (1873) (Field.
J., dissenting); Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 316,321-22 (1867); Ho Ah Kow v. Nunan, 12
F. Cas. 252 (C.C.D. Cal. 1879) (No. 6546).
151. As others have noted, the physical power explanation for Field's personal jurisdiction
concepts is inadequate for another reason. The need for physical power has been explained as relating to
concerns about the enforceability of judgments. While this may be a legitimate worry in the interna-
tional context, it is not clear why it is a problem in our federal system in which states are bound under the
full faith and credit clause to enforce the judgments of other states. See Jay, "Minimum Contacts" as a
UnifiedTheorvofPersonalIJursdiction:A Reappraisal. 59 N.C.L. REv. 429.453 (1981): Kurland. The
Supreme Court, the Due Process Clause and the In Personam Jurisdiction of State Courts, 25 U. CHI.
L. REv. 569. 585 (1958).
152. Professor Whitten has argued that prior to Pennoyer there was a general understanding that
territorial limits on personal jurisdiction could be altered by state legislatures. Whitten, supra note 143.
at 800-04. Whitten cites, forexample, Justice Johnson's dissent in Mills v. Duryee, I I U.S. (7 Cranch)
481 (1813), in which Johnson observed that the territorial rules of personal jurisdiction were "eternal
principles of justice" which "never ought to be dispensed with, and which courts of justice never can
dispense with, but when compelled by positive statute.'" Id. at 486 (emphasis added); accord Hol-
lingsworth v. Barbour, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 466, 472 (1830); see Whitten, supra note 143, at 801. Whitten
concludes that "the predominant pre-fourteenth amendment view would have rejected due process as
limiting the legislature's power to exceed the territorial rules ofjurisdictions." Id. at 803-04 (emphasis
in original). One might add of course, that those holding this predominant view would probably also
have rejected the premise of substantive due process-that the due process clause limits substantive
legislative power. These observations, however, simply highlight that Field's opinion in Pennoyer
reflects more than his views about personal jurisdiction, it reflects a new view of states' substantive
legislative authority.
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which Field wanted to establish throughout the second half of his judicial
career. 
153
2. Due Process
Field was the "pioneer and prophet" of the doctrine of substantive due
process. 154 His opinions during the 1870's and 1880's, largely dissents and
concurrences, formed the foundation for the substantive due process ap-
proach later embraced in Lochner v. New York. 155 Field's view was that
there were certain fundamental and inalienable rights. These rights were
not created by the fourteenth amendment. Rather, the fourteenth amend-
ment provided the mechanism for protecting these rights from intrusions by
the states. 156 In Field's view, the fourteenth amendment "was intended to
give practical effect to the declaration of 1776 of inalienable rights, rights
which are the gift of the Creator; which the law does not confer, but only
recognizes."1 57 Field's concept of what rights were fundamental was quite
broad 158 and he was deeply troubled by what he perceived to be a rising tide
of socialism and a growing use of government power to alter or limit those
fundamental private rights. 159 He became preoccupied by a desire to
establish the limits of government power, and he viewed the fourteenth
amendment as one of the best weapons available in that fight. His views in
this area were entrenched, 160 and though repeatedly in the minority, he
153. Pennoyer is not the only case in which Field was willing to embark on extended discussions of
the fourteenth amendment even where such discussions were not strictly necessary to the decision in the
particular case. See, e.g., Butchers' Union Co. v. Crescent City Co., 111 U.S. 746, 754 (1884) (Field, J.,
concurring); Bartemeyer v. Iowa, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 129, 138-41 (1874) (Field, J., concurring). As one
commentator has observed about Field's propensity toward dicta: "For Field, it is not this case that is of
crucial importance, but this class of cases, and the statement of a correct or an incorrect principle
governing the class of cases." W. Goedecke, supra note 139, at 85-86.
154. Corwin, The Supreme Court and the Fourteenth Amendment, 7 MICH. L. REv. 643, 653
(1909); see Graham, Justice Field and the Fourteenth Amendment, 52 YALE L.J. 851, 853 (1943).
155. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); see Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Holmes and the
Constitution, 41 HARV. L. REv. 121, 141 (1927).
156. See Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678, 690 (1888) (Field, J., dissenting).
157. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36,105 (1873) (Field, J., dissenting); see Powell v.
Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678, 692 (1888) (Field, J., dissenting); Butchers' Union Co. v. Crescent City
Co., 111 U.S. 746,756 (1884) (Field, L, concurring); see also Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.)
316, 321-22 (1867).
158. See Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678, 692-94 (1888) (Field, J., dissenting); Butchers'
Union Co. v. Crescent City Co., 111 U.S. 746,756-58 (1884) (Field, L, concurring); Munn v. Illinois,
94 U.S. 113, 141-44 (1877) (Field, J., dissenting); Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36,
96-98 (1873) (Field, J., dissenting); see also O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323,362-63 (1892) (Field,
J., dissenting).
159. See Graham, supra note 154, at 853-57.
160. See id.
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continued to write empassioned opinions setting forth his views on the
fourteenth amendment. 161
In the midst of Field's as yet unsuccessful battle to use the fourteenth
amendment as a weapon limiting state power, Pennoyer v. Neff must have
been a real bright spot. As one commentator observed, the opinion in
Pennoyer was undoubtedly for Field a "labor of love." 162 Pennoyer appears
to be the first case in which a state action or statute was actually invalidated
and the fourteenth amendment was cited as a basis for such invalidation.
Pennoyer offered an ideal vehicle for Field to set forth his approach to the
fourteenth amendment. Factually, it appeared that an injustice had been
done. In addition, the case did not concern the more controversial areas of
economic and social regulation. Further, while the scope of the due process
clause as a limit on substantive state regulation was unclear, there was
general agreement that the due process clause had something to do with
what procedures were required. 163 Thus, Pennoyer offered an opportune
vehicle for Field to set forth his fourteenth amendment jurisprudence in a
relatively noncontroversial context. Once the general approach was estab-
lished in the area of procedure, the Court could move into the more
controversial substantive areas. 164
Field appears to have taken full advantage of the opportunity, and his
approach in Pennoyer parallels in several respects his approach in other
fourteenth amendment cases. 165 First, and most basically, the focus is not
on concerns about fairness to the particular defendant, but instead is on the
inherent limitations on the power of governments. Early in the Pennoyer
opinion, Field articulates what he believes to be two central and self-
161. See, e.g., Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678, 687 (1888) (Field, J., dissenting); Butchers'
Union Co. v. Crescent City Co., 111 U.S. 746, 756 (1884) (Field, J., concurring); Munn v. Illinois, 94
U.S. 113, 136 (1877) (Field, J., dissenting); Bartemeyer v. Iowa, 85 U.S. 129, 140 (1874) (Field, J.,
concurring). The strength of Field's convictions in this area is demonstrated by the opinions he wrote
while riding circuit in the Ninth Circuit. See, e.g., County of San Mateo v. Southern Pac. R.R., 13 F.
Cas. 722 (C.C.D. Cal. 1882); Ho Ah Kow v. Nunan, 12 F. Cas. 252 (C.C.D. Cal. 1879) (No. 6546); In
re Ah Fong, I F. Cas. 213 (C.C.D. Cal. 1874) (No. 102). These circuit opinions include broad dicta
about the fourteenth amendment and statements which seem to be at odds with the then current position
of the Supreme Court. See Graham, supra note 154, at 883-87.
162. Hough, Due Process of Law-To-day, 32 HARV. L. REV. 218, 226 (1919).
163. See id; see also Bird, supra note 149, at 45; Mendelson, A Missing Link in the Evolution of
Due Process, 10 VAND. L. REv. 125, 125-26 (1956).
164. As Professor Willis observed, "after the Supreme Court had made the due process clause
apply to legislation so far as concerned matters of legal procedure, it was easy for it to extend the
doctrine to legislation so far as concerned matters of substantive law." Willis, Due Process of Law
Under the United States Constitution, 74 U. PA. L. REv. 331, 336 (1926).
165. See generally Butchers' Union Co. v. Crescent City Co., 111 U.S. 746, 759 (1884) (Field, J.,
concurring); Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 140 (1877) (Field, J., dissenting); Slaughter-House Cases,
83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 83 (1873) (Field, J., dissenting); Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 316
(1867); W. Goedecke, supra note 139, at 81.
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evident rules about state power: "that every State possesses exclusive
jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and property within its ter-
ritory" 166 and "that no State can exercise direct jurisdiction and authority
over persons or property without its territory. ' 167 From these premises
Field derives his conclusion that in personam jurisdiction exists only where
there has been service in the state. Later in the opinion, Field does note that
his approach to personal jurisdiction is consistent with concerns about
issuing proper notice to the defendant. 168 Nonetheless, the focus of the
opinion is not on notice or insuring litigation fairness. 169 Instead, it is on the
inherent limitations of government power. Given this focus, that there is no
mention in the opinion of the plaintiff and his interests is not surprising;
Field perceived the case as a confrontation between government power and
the defendant-the plaintiff's interest is simply irrelevant. 170
A second interesting parallel between Pennoyer and Field's other four-
teenth amendment decisions is that in all of these cases, Field treats the
fourteenth amendment not as the source of the rights in question, but rather
as a device for recognizing and enforcing preexisting and inalienable
rights. 171 This purely instrumental approach to the due process clause is
apparent both from the structure of the Pennoyer opinion and from the due
process discussion itself. The discussion of the due process clause comes at
the end of the opinion, after Field concluded that there was no personal
jurisdiction and that enforcement of the judgment could be resisted on the
basis of the full faith and credit cause.172 Moreover, when Field does
address the due process clause, his discussion strongly suggests that the
due process clause is not itself the source of the personal jurisdiction
principles. This is apparent from the last sentence of the paragraph in which
166. Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 722.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 726.
169. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
170. This approach to the case stands in contrast to Deady's approach. As discussed earlier, Deady
treated the case less as a confrontation between the government and the defendant, and more as a
confrontation between the plaintiff and the defendant. Field, on the other hand, perceived the problem
in Pennoyer as being a confrontation between government power and private rights.
171. See, e.g., Butchers' Union Co. v. Crescent City Co., 111 U.S. 746, 756-57 (1884) (Field, J.,
concurring); Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 105 (1873) (Field, J., dissenting). See
generally Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678,690-94(1888) (Field, J., dissenting); Munnv. Illinois,
94 U.S. 113, 136 (1877) (Field, J., dissenting). W. Goedecke, supra note 139, at 77-78.
172. Because Pennoyer v. Neff was in federal court, the full faith and credit clause of the
Constitution was not involved, but the comparable provision for federal courts now embodied in 28
U.S.C. § 1738 (1982).
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Field discusses due process.173 In that sentence, Field talks about both
personal jurisdiction and subject matter jurisdiction as prerequisites to a
valid and enforceable judgment. Subject matter jurisdiction and personal
jurisdiction are put on the same footing in his due process analysis, yet one
would certainly not infer that Field meant to suggest that the determination
of whether there is subject matter jurisdiction is controlled by the due
process clause. All that Field says in Pennoyer is that due process requires
that a court rendering ajudgment have subject matter and personal jurisdic-
tion. He does not say that the due process clause provides the criteria for
determining whether such jurisdiction exists. 174
In Pennoyer, as in his other fourteenth amendment cases, 175 Field looks
elsewhere for the substantive rights protected by the fourteenth amend-
ment. The result is that the rules for determining when personal jurisdiction
exists were analyzed independent of the due process clause itself. Field
thought the rules for determining when personal jurisdiction exists derived
from universally accepted principles of international law and concerns
about relations among independent states. The substance of the rules for
personal jurisdiction have little to do with protecting defendants, but given
that the rules exist, the defendant has the right under the due process clause
to insist that the rules are followed.
This basic approach in which the fourteenth amendment is used as an
instrument for implementing preexisting rights leads to a third similarity
between Pennoyer and Field's other fourteenth amendment opinions. It
seems to be characteristic of Field (and probably others of his era) that he
thought fundamental natural law rights were largely self-evident. 176 As a
173. The paragraph on the due process clause states:
Since the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution, the validity of
such judgments may be directly questioned, and their enforcement in the State resisted, on the
ground that proceedings in a court of justice to determine the personal rights and obligations of
parties over whom the court has no jurisdiction, do not constitute due process of law. . . . [T]here
can be no doubt of [the meaning of those terms] when applied to judicial proceedings. They then
mean a course of legal proceedings according to those rules and principles which have been
established in our systems ofjurisprudence for the protection and enforcement of private rights. To
give such proceedings any validity, there must be a tribunal competent by its constitution-that is,
by the law of its creation-to pass upon the subject-matter of the suit; and, if that involves merely a
determination of the personal liability of the defendant, he must be brought within its jurisdiction
by service of process within the State, or his voluntary appearance.
Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 733.
174. See Abrams & Dimond, Toward a Constitutional Framework for the Control of State Court
Jurisdiction, 69 MINN. L. REV. 75, 78 n. 18 (1984); Rheinstein, supra note 138, at 791.
175. See, e.g., O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 362-63 (1892) (Field, J., dissenting); Butchers'
Union Co. v. Crescent City Co., 111 U.S. 746, 756-57 (1884) (Field, J., concurring); Slaughter-House
Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 96 (1873) (Field, J., dissenting).
176. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 105. See generally C. SwISHER, supra note
139, at 426 (noting that "the content of these rights which he [Field] endeavored to protect through his
judicial decisions was largely made up of his own ideas as to what was good in the life around him").
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result, he was not as rigorous as one would have liked in his analysis of the
supposed preexisting rules of natural law.177
Field's analysis of what he thought to be the universally accepted rules of
personal jurisdiction is similarly unsatisfying. Field asserts that it would be
an "encroachment upon the independence" of a sister state for a forum to
exercise jurisdiction over persons or property outside its borders." 178 Field
never explains why one state is hurt by another state's exercise of judicial
jurisdiction. How was California (Neff's supposed state of residence at the
time of the original suit) hurt by Oregon's exercise of jurisdiction? Califor-
nia may be hurt when Oregon taxes people or property in California, at
least if there is a limit on multiple taxation. It may be hurt when Oregon
substantive laws are applied to conduct in California since that might
encourage conduct which California considers undesirable or discourage
conduct which it considers beneficial. It is far from clear, though, how
California is hurt from the mere exercise of judicial jurisdiction by a sister
state. 179 Moreover, as in the Slaughter-House Cases, Field overstates the
evidence-the "universal" principles of personal jurisdiction were not as
universally accepted as Field thought them to be. 180
177. The Slaughter-House Cases, for example, concerned a monopoly granted by the state of
Louisiana to one New Orleans slaughterhouse. In the Slaughter-House Cases Field focused on the
privilege and immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment rather than the due process clause. After
the decision in the Slaughter-House Cases, Field shifted his focus to the due process clause. Nonethe-
less, this shift did not affect the basic analysis and Field's opinion in the Slaughter-House Cases
remains one of the classic articulations of the position which formed the foundation for substantive due
process. Field thought it largely self-evident that such a monopoly violated fundamental law. He
asserted early in his dissent: "No one will deny the abstract justice which lies in the position of the
plaintiffs in error .. " 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 86. To Field, it was unthinkable that the states could
have the power to grant monopolies and thereby interfere with "the sacred right of labor." Id. at 106.
Though Field did attempt to reinforce his views with some objective evidence-specifically the
treatment of monopolies in England-Field substantially overstates the evidence. After a lengthy
discussion, Field concurred that "[t]he common law of England. . .condemned all monopolies in any
known trade or manufacture, and declared void all grants of-special privileges whereby others could be
deprived of any liberty which they previously had, or be hindered in their lawful trade." Id. at 104. This
conclusion is simply not accurate-the battles in England were not so much over whether monopolies
could be granted but over who should grant them. See Letwin, The English Common Law Concerning
Monopolies, 21 U. CHI. L. REv. 355 (1954).
Some other examples of the universal and self-evident propositions set forth by Field were that the
issuance of paper money violated the "universal law of currency," Julliard v. Greenman, 110 U.S. 421,
452 (1884) (Field, J., dissenting), and that all nations "possessing any degree of civilization" observed
Sunday closing laws. Exparte Newman, 9 Cal. 502, 520 (1858) (Field, J., dissenting).
178. Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 723.
179. See Abrams & Dimond, supra note 174, at 84; Drobak, supra note 53, at 1050.
180. See supra notes 138, 139; see also Casad, supra note 138, at 61; Ehrenzweig, supra note 132,
at 289 n.3, 299, 308; Note, supra note 138, passim. Field thought that the jurisdictional limits on state
taxing authority were similarly self-evident. In Case of the State Tax on Foreign-Held Bonds, 82 U.S.
(15 Wall.) 300, 319 (1872), he asserts:
[PIroperty lying beyond the jurisdiction of the State is not a subject upon which her taxing power
can be legitimately exercised. Indeed, it would seem that no adjudication should be necessary to
Washington Law Review
Field's lack of rigor in analyzing what he thought to be the preexisting
rules of personal jurisdiction may not be surprising. Not only might Field
have thought those principles to be self-evident, but the precise contours of
these principles were not relevant to the actual case (since the in personam
discussion was dictum). Moreover, the scope of these preexisting princi-
ples may not have been Field's primary concern. Field may have been less
concerned about the precise contours of the rules for personal jurisdiction
and more concerned about the framework which he offered for analyzing
fourteenth amendment cases.
Field's opinion in Pennoyer is not merely of historical interest. As is so
often the case, the person who frames the issue controls the debate. So it is
with personal jurisdiction. Field's opinion continues to influence personal
jurisdiction doctrine today. 181
III. JURISDICTION TODAY
In the one hundred plus years since Pennoyer, the Court has expanded
significantly the jurisdictional power of states. If Pennoyer arose today, the
court would probably decide there was personal jurisdiction. 182 Despite the
changes, personal jurisdiction retains a doctrinal core derived from Field's
opinion. Just as in Field's time, personal jurisdiction continues to be treated
as a substantive due process right. 183 Similarly, modern courts continue to
perceive personal jurisdiction as a confrontation between state power and
establish so obvious a proposition. The power of taxation . . . is necessarily limited to subjects
within the jurisdiction of the State. These subjects are persons, property, and business.
181. See generally Hazard, supra note 108, at 241; Jay, supra note 151.
182. See supra text accompanying notes 124-25.
183. See R. FIELD, B. KAPLAN & K. CLERMONT, CIVIL PROCEDURE 717 n.e (4th ed. 1978);
Rheinstein, supra note 138, at 789; Whitten, supra note 143, at 736. Classifying personal jurisdiction as
a substantive rather than a procedural due process concept eliminates an anomaly that would otherwise
exist. Field noted in Pennoyer that "proceedings in a court... [which lacks personal jurisdiction] do
not constitute due process of law," Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 733, but it does not necessarily follow from this
that such proceedings violate the due process clause. A violation of the clause requires deprivation of
life, liberty, or property. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 672 (1977); Board of Regents v. Roth,
408 U.S. 564,570-71 (1972). Specifically, it is not at all clear that a taking of life or property occurs by
virtue of the mere assertion of jurisdiction, prior to judgment or enforcement of a judgment. See
Rheinsten, supra note 138, at 779; Note, supra note 138, at 453-55. Nonetheless, the Court has found
violations of the due process clause in cases before there was enforcement or even ajudgment. See, e.g.,
World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodsen, 444 U.S. 286 (1980); Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84
(1978). Moreover, in some of these cases it seems unlikely that enforcement ever would be sought
against the complaining defendant. In World-Wide Volkswagen, forexample, even if the local dealer had
stayed in the case and the plaintiff had prevailed, one suspects that it would be the manufacturer not the
local dealer who would ultimately pay. If personal jurisdiction is a substantive due process right,
however, then the mere existence of a proceeding in an improper forum is itself a taking of liberty
regardless of whether it results later in a taking of property. This further suggests that York v. Texas, 137
U.S. 15 (1890), has at least been partially overruled. That case held that the mere entry of a judgment
which was void for lack of personal jurisdiction is not a taking of liberty or property.
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the defendant, with the plaintiff's interest being largely irrelevant. 184
Finally, modern courts assume, as did Field, that the proper scope of
personal jurisdiction is closely tied to geographic boundaries.
That personal jurisdiction is treated as a substantive due process protec-
tion has not always been recognized. Much of the recent commentary
critical of current personal jurisdiction doctrine assumes that the only
interest properly considered is the strictly procedural concern185 of litiga-
tion fairness. 186 Certainly, however, the Court thinks there is some broader
substantive interest at stake-some interest tied to state boundaries. 1
87 This
is demonstrated by the Court's continued insistence that the defendant have
sufficient "contacts" with the state. Thus, although it has abandoned
Pennoyer's inflexible requirement of actual physical presence,188 the Court
continues to require that the defendant have engaged in some purposeful
activities directed at the forum or its residents. 189 Moreover, the "contacts"
requirement of the modern approach is intended as something more than
some rough test of convenience. 190 This point is vividly demonstrated by
184. The Court has repeatedly stressed that state interest is a relevant consideration in assessing
whether personal jurisdiction exists and has sometimes even suggested that the state's interest is
dispositive. See, e.g., Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 214-15 (1977); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S.
235, 252 (1958); McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957); Mullane v. Central
Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950); Lewis, supra note 45. The Court has, by
contrast, paid far less attention to the plaintiff's interest. See, e.g., World-Wide Volkswagen v.
Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
185. See J. NOwAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTrtIONAL LAW 417 (2d ed. 1983); Grey,
Procedural Fairness and Substantive Rights, in DUE PRocass; NOMOS XVIII 183 (J. Pennock & J.
Chapman eds. 1977).
186. See, e.g., Lewis, supra note 45, at 771; Redish, Due Process, Federalism and Personal
Jurisdiction: A Theoretical Evaluation, 75 Nw. U.L. REv. 1112 (1981); Weintraub, Due Process
Limitations on the Personal Jurisdiction of State Courts: Time for Change, 63 OREG. L. REv. 485,
522-27 (1984).
187. One commentator has described the approach as "neo-territorial." McDougal, Judicial
Jurisdiction: From a Contacts to an Interest Analysis, 35 VAND. L. Rav. 1, 4 (1982).
188. See, e.g., Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984); Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 105 S. Ct.
2174 (1985); see also Clermont, supra note 142, at 445 (noting that the Court has shifted from a focus on
physical power to "metaphorical power"). But see Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186,213 (1977) (noting
that the defendants never "set foot" in the forum).
189. SeeAsahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 107 S. Ct. 1026, 1031-33 (O'Connor, J., for the
plurality), 1035 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and in the judgment) (1987); Burger King Corp. v.
Rudzewicz, 105 S. Ct. 2174, 2182 (1985); World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297
(1980); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).
190. See Hanson, 357 U.S. at 251 (restrictions on personal jurisdiction "more than a guarantee of
immunity from inconvenient. . . litigation"), quoted in World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444
U.S. 286, 294 (1980); Abrams, Power, Convenience, and the Elimination of Personal Jurisdiction in
the Federal Courts, 58 IND. L.J. 1, 21-22 (1982); Redish, supra note 186, at 1117-18, 1137. But see
Clermont, supra note 142, at 416; Lewis, The Three Deaths of "State Sovereignty" and the Curse of
Abstraction in the Jurisprudence of Personal Jurisdiction, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 699, 709 (1983)
(suggesting that the minimum contacts test is a rule of thumb for estimating convenience and
reasonableness). In International Shoe, the Court did mention an "estimate of the inconveniences"
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the Court's recent opinion in Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court in
which the Court treated the contacts test and concerns about litigation
fairness as distinct elements, with both necessary in order to support
jurisdiction. 191 Second, in today's world with modern transportation and
metropolitan areas which overlap multiple states, the contacts test with its
emphasis on state boundaries seems a crude and inappropriate measure of
convenience. Finally, the Court's application of the contacts requirement
shows little concern for actual litigation convenience. The focus is on past
rather than current contacts 192 and it is sufficient for the defendant to have
"directed" his activities at a resident of the forum 93 or to have purposefully
availed himself of privileges or protection of the forum 94 regardless of
whether the defendant has ever been physically present in the forum.
If the contacts requirement and territoriality element of personal juris-
diction have nothing to do with convenience, then what is the interest they
are intended to protect? The Court has never offered much explanation but
seems simply to have accepted Field's approach as largely self-evident. In
International Shoe, for example, the Court merely asserts that the due
process clause "does not contemplate that a state may make binding a
judgment in personam against an individual or corporate defendant with
which the state has no contacts, ties, or relations." 195 The Court, however,
never explains why such a judgment would violate the due process clause,
or why personal jurisdiction must be tied to state boundaries. Likewise, in
Insurance Corporation of Ireland the Court states that "[t]he personal
jurisdiction requirement recognizes and protects an individual liberty
interest." 196 Yet, the Court nowhere explains what that liberty interest is or
why it has some connection with state boundaries. 197
which result from distant litigation, 326 U.S. at 317, but this factor was in addition to the "minimum
contacts" requirement.
191. Justice O'Connor wrote for the Court. The analytical portion of her opinion is divided into two
sections. In the first section she analyzed whether the defendant had sufficient contacts with the forum
and concluded that it did not. 107 S. Ct. at 1029-31. In the second section she analyzed fairness
considerations and concluded that litigation in the forum would be unfair and unreasonable. Id. at 1035.
Five Justices dissented from the section of the opinion discussing the contacts test and specifically found
that the defendant did have sufficient contacts. Id. at 1035-38 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and in the
judgment); id. at 1038 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and in the judgment). However, these five Justices
concurred in O'Connor's analysis of the fairness considerations, and thus, although they thought that
there were sufficient contacts to satisfy that prong of the jurisdictional test, they nonetheless concluded
that fairness considerations defeated jurisdiction in this case.
192. See, e.g., McDaniel v. Armstrong World Indus., 603 F. Supp. 1337, 1343 (D.D.C. 1985).
193. See Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984).
194. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 105 S. Ct. 2174 (1985).
195. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945).
196. Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694,702 (1982).
197. Moreover, the Court nowhere acknowledges the extensive case law concerning the meaning
of "liberty" in the due process clause. See, e.g., Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality
& Reform, 431 U.S. 816,845-46 (1977); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693,699-718. reh'g denied. 425 U.S.
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A. Defining the Interests Protected by Personal Jurisdiction
1. Territorial Limitations on State Power
On a few occasions, the Supreme Court has attempted to go beyond its
usual treatment of the personal jurisdiction rules as self-evident and to offer
some explanation for the territorially based framework established by Pen-
noyer. Nevertheless, the explanations have been brief and inadequate. One
explanation the Court has offered is that it is a consequence of the "territorial
limitations on the power of the respective States. "198 In other words, juris-
diction represents an assertion of state authority and state authority is inher-
ently territorially limited. 199 This observation, however, explains nothing
985 (1976); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972);
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923); Butler v. Perry, 240 U.S. 328, 333 (1916); Allgeyer v.
Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 589 (1897). See generally J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note
185, at 452-61; Saphire, Specifying Due Process Values: Toward a More Responsive Approach to
Procedural Protection, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 111, 133-39 (1978). This mere assertion of a liberty interest
seems even more startling coming from the same Court which has in recent years taken some pains to
narrow the scope of "liberty." See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2841,2843-46 (1986); Olim v.
Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238 (1983); Hewittv. Helms, 459 U.S. 460 (1983); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S.
215 (1976); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972);
Monaghan, Of "Liberty" and "Property," 62 CORNELL L. REv. 405 (1977).
198. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958), quoted in World-Wide Volkswagen v.
Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 294 (1980).
199. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 n.20 (1977); Weisburd, TerritorialAuthority and
Personal Jurisdiction, 63 WASH. U.L.Q. 377, 383 (1985). In support of this position that judicial
jurisdiction is inherently territorially limited, Professor Weisburd has argued that there are similar
sovereignty constraints which limit states' authority to tax nonresidents, to regulate property in other
states, or to punish nonresidents for crimes in other states. Id. at 386-401. While it is true that state
authority in these other areas is not unlimited, modern cases in these areas do not support the conclusion
that the constraints on state authority stem from territorial sovereignty.
In the tax area, although the early cases talk in terms of territorial limits of state sovereignty, see, e.g.,
Case of the State Tax on Foreign-Held Bonds, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 300, 319 (1872); Hays v. Pacific Mail
S.S. Co., 58 U.S. (17 How.) 596,598 (1854), this is no longer true. While the Court continues to require
that there be some minimal connection between the state and the nonresident taxpayer, this requirement
is not related to territorial sovereignty, but stems from the fact that taxes are the quid pro quo for services
rendered by a state and thus can only be levied against those who plausibly received something from the
state. "The simple but controlling question is whether the state has given anything for which it can ask
return." Asarco Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 458 U.S. 307,315 (1982) (quoting Wisconsin v. J.C.
Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435,444 (1940)). As ProfessorMartin has observed, the modern tax cases seem to
be more concerned with fairness than territorial power. See Martin, A Reply to Professor Kirgis, 62
CORNELL L. REv. 151, 152 (1976); see also Redish, supra note 186, at 1135.
The cases concerning lack of state authority to regulate property or crimes in other states are
examples of situations in which state regulatory authority, sometimes called legislative jurisdiction, is
limited. At the outset, it should be noted that the Court has generally allowed a state very broad
authority to apply its laws to situations largely unconnected to that state. See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v.
Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981). Moreover, as in the tax cases, to the extent the Court has limited states'
legislative jurisdiction it has generally not relied on notions of territorial sovereignty, but has instead
focused on concerns about fairness. See W. RICHMAN & W. REYNOLDS, UNDERSTANDING CONFLICT OF
LAWS 244, 246 (1984). In particular, the Court has focused on the expectations of the parties at the time
of the conduct in question. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 105 S. Ct. 2965, 2980-81 (1985);
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about personal jurisdiction. Of course, the authority of states is in some sense
limited territorially. Unless this is an attempt to revive Field's discredited
notion that states can only "directly" affect things located within the state, 2°
however, this observation is quite unhelpful. One could argue that as long as a
state court is physically located within the state which established it and does
not roam around the country looking for disputes but instead only resolves
Redish, supra note 186, at 1134. The two specific areas which Weisburd discusses provide, at best, weak
support for his position. As to the local action rule, while there is authority that seems to treat the rule as
a jurisdictional matter linked to state territorial sovereignty, there are other cases which treat the rule as
a matter of venue, not jurisdictional power. See Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Copeland, 398 F.2d 364,
367 n.5 (4th Cir. 1968) (noting there is disagreement about whether local action rule is a matter of
jurisdiction or venue); J. FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE 87 (1985). Compare
Eddington v. Texas & New Orleans R.R., 83 F. Supp. 230 (S.D. Tex. 1949) (local action rule is a matter
of venue), with Asociacion de Reclamantes v. United Mexican States, 735 F.2d 1517, 1521-22 (D.C.
Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1051 (1985) (local action rule is a matter of jurisdiction). Moreover,
as Professor Currie has observed, the local action rule seems to be largely grounded in English history
and the forms of common law; Currie, The Constitution and the "Transitory" Cause of Action, 73
HARV. L. REV. 36, 67-72 (1959); see Wicker, The Development of the Distinction Between Local and
Transitory Actions, 4 TENN. L. REV. 55 (1925). Moreover, the rule itself has been criticized. See, e.g.,
W. Richman & W. Reynolds, supra, at 100-01, 218-20. In the criminal area, it is true that under the
traditional common law approach, a state could assert criminal jurisdiction only if the gravamen of the
offense occurred within the territorial boundaries of the forum. See Comment, Jurisdiction Over Felony
Murder, 50 U. Cm. L. REV. 1431, 1434 (1983). However, not only has strict territoriality eroded over the
years, see generally L. BRILMAYER, AN INTRODUCTION TO JURISDICTION 324-26 (1986), there is
relatively little authority on the extent to which a territorial approach is constitutionally mandated. See
Rotenberg, Extraterritorial Legislative Jurisdiction and the State Criminal Law, 38 TEX. L. REV. 763,
773-81 (1960). Moreover, any constitutional limits that do exist may reflect, at least in part, venue and
vicinage requirements imposed by the sixth amendment, see generally L. BRILMAYER, supra, at
329-35, or concerns about subjecting conduct to conflicting criminal standards, see Nielson v. Oregon,
212 U.S. 315, 321 (1909), rather than concerns about the inherent territoriality of state power.
Finally, the antisuit injunction cases seem to have little to do with territorial sovereignty. As Weisburd
himself notes, injunctions against suits in other states are not considered void, Weisburd, supra, at 391
n.62, and thus they do not support the broad proposition that state courts lack jurisdiction to issue orders
the legal consequences of which are "felt exclusively outside the forum state." Id. at 391. As Professor
Reese has explained, the reason why antisuit injunctions are not subject to the full faith and credit clause
is that they are "thought to be a situation where the national policy of full faith and credit should bow
before the obvious interest of an individual state in being permitted. . . to control the actions of its own
courts." Reese, Full Faith and Credit to Foreign Equity Decrees, 42 IOWA L. REV. 183, 198 (1957); see
also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS § 103 comment b (1971). Thus, antisuit injunctions involve
issues of comity and the relations between coequal sovereigns rather than issues of power.
200. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. at 722; see Hazard, supra 108, at 264.
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questions that have been brought before it by a plaintiff, then it has fully
complied with the territorial limitation on its authority to adjudicate. 2° I
2. Federalism
The Court has also explained the prominence of territoriality in modern
personal jurisdiction theory as having something to do with federalism, that
is, with the protection of states from other states. As the Court explained in
World-Wide Volkswagen, the due process clause "acting as an instrument of
interstate federalism" may divest a state ofjurisdiction even where there is no
unfairness to the defendant. 202 This explanation seems to derive from Field's
mention of international law and concerns about relations among states. 203
Nonetheless, the Court's federalism theory seems to be a misapplication of
Field's opinion. Field's discussion of international law was simply part of his
analysis of what he saw as the inherent limitation on state power.204 But Field
understood as well as anyone that due process was a protection for individu-
als, not a protection for states. His opinions on the fourteenth amendment
vividly demonstrate that he believed that provision to be a major limitation
on the power of states to affect the rights of individuals. 20 5 Nowhere in his
fourteenth amendment opinions does Field express concern about protecting
states from other states; his sole concern was to protect private rights from
usurpation by the states. 206 Most importantly, regardless of whether the
201. Some commentators have argued that judicial jurisdiction is proper only if the conduct
involved has a sufficient connection with the forum that the forum could properly regulate that conduct.
See Brilmayer, How Contacts Count: Due Process Limitations on State Court Jurisdiction, 1980 Sup.
Cr. REV. 77; Weisburd, supra note 199, at 404-05. This assumes, however, that the scope of judicial
jurisdiction should be no more extensive than legislative jurisdiction. It is not obvious why this should
be so. See Twerski, On Territoriality and Sovereignty: System Shock and Constitutional Choice ofLaw,
10 Ho sTRA L. REv. 149, 151 n.7 (1981), and authorities cited therein. Overly expansive legislative
jurisdiction is not only more intrusive into the sovereignty of other jurisdictions, it presents the potential
for subjecting people to inconsistent legal standards. For example, it would be unacceptable for the
State of Nevada to legislate the speed limit in California. Judicial jurisdiction does not present these
problems (or at least not to the same degree).
202. 444 U.S. 286, 294 (1980).
203. See Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 722-23; Redish, supra note 191, at 1116.
204. See supra notes 175-80 and accompanying text.
205. See supra cases cited in note 153.
206. Further, for all the talk in Pennoyer about sovereignty of states, that is surely not what the case
is about, because the result of the case is in fact a major intrusion into state sovereignty. The issue in
Pennoyer was not whether the prior judgment could be enforced. The issue was whether the federal
court would evict a holder of a title issued pursuant to a sheriff's auction held pursuant to an Oregon
judgment. The federal court in Pennoyer v. Neff did not merely decline to enforce a judgment, it
affirmatively undid the prior action of the Oregon state court. This is hardly a step which preserves state
sovereignty.
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federalism explanation is consistent with Field's opinion, it simply makes no
sense to turn the fourteenth amendment from a provision protecting citizens
from states into a provision protecting states from other states. As others have
amply demonstrated, contrary to the Court's assertion in World-Wide Vol-
kswagen, the due process clause is surely not "an instrument of interstate
federalism. "207
3. Individual Liberty Interests
More recently, the Court has itself acknowledged that the federalism
explanation is inconsistent with its theory that the principle of personal
207. 444 U.S. at 294; see, e.g., Lewis, supra note 45, at 809-12; Redish, supra note 186, at
1113-14, 1129, 1132.
Professor Brilmayer has offered a variation of a federalism argument to explain why it is constitu-
tionally necessary that defendants be able to control where they are subject to suit. She argues that
unless we require purposeful contacts by the defendant with the forum, states could improperly impose
costs on nonresident consumers because defendants who could not structure their conduct to avoid high
cost states would have to raise their prices to everyone to cover the potential cost. Brilmayer, supra note
201, at 94-96. This explanation is not adequate for several reasons. First, it is important to recognize
that the costs at issue are not the costs of litigation or the amount of any liability judgment-they are
only the difference in cost in litigating in one place rather than another. Thus, the scale of the costs
involved is relatively small. Second, even requiring purposeful contacts, states can still impose costs on
nonresidents. Brilmayer assumes that if defendants can structure their conduct to avoid high cost
jurisdictions they can and will either decline to deal with that jurisdiction or will deal with residents of
that jurisdiction only at a higher price which reflects the higher cost of potential litigation there. This
assumes that price discrimination is possible, an assumption that is not always warranted. Suppose the
National Enquirer were to decide that California is a high cost jurisdiction in which to litigate. It could
stop selling newspapers in California or it could charge a higher price in California. The National
Enquirer might also choose, however, a third course which is to charge a higher price nationwide. It
might take this third course if it were not practically or economically feasible to charge a different price
in California. Thus, even under a system which requires purposeful contacts, people in Florida may pay
more for the National Enquirer simply because California is an expensive place to litigate. Finally,
Brilmayer analyzes the economic implications of imposing those costs on the defendant, but does not
consider the implications of imposing those costs on the plaintiff. If the plaintiff is in Oklahoma and the
defendant is in New York, then one of them will have to bear the cost of distant litigation. If the
jurisdictional rules force the plaintiff to litigate in New York, then it is the plaintiff who is forced to bear
these costs. New York could permit successful plaintiffs to recover the expenses associated with
litigating in that more distant forum, but New York has no incentive to impose such a cost shifting rule
because the absence of such a rule is a way to lower the costs of its local businesses at the expense of
people who live in other states. See Kalo, Jurisdiction as an Evolutionary Process: The Development of
Quasi In Rem and In Personam Principles, 1978 DUKE L.J. 1147, 1185-86.
One might respond, of course, that the plaintiff knowingly bought the product and that this justifies a
general rule that plaintiffs must assume the cost of distant litigation. Thus, when someone buys a
product from a New York firm, he knows that the true cost of that product is the cash price, plus the cost
of litigating in New York times the likelihood of such litigation. Having calculated the true price, our
knowledgeable buyer may conclude that New York products are too expensive and buy fewer of them.
Thus, New York pays the price for its refusal to have a cost shifting rule. For this analysis to work,
however, we must assume that the buyer is in a position to know where each product has come from and
thus to properly calculate its true cost. Buyers may not have this information, and even if they did, it
might be so time-consuming to make these individual calculations, that it is more efficient for buyers to
spread this risk over all purchases from all states.
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jurisdiction emanates from the due process clause.20 8 The due process
clause protects individual rights, not states' rights. This recognition,
though, has not eliminated the territoriality element. 20 9 Now the Court
merely asserts that the territoriality element is necessary in order to protect
citizens. The shift still does not explain why boundaries should matter; it in
fact presents the problem more boldly. If the due process clause protects
litigants, then before one can define and rationalize the appropriate test,
one must first determine what it is one is protecting litigants from. That the
Court has never asked this question, let alone attempted to answer it, may
be the strongest testament to the grip which Pennoyer holds on us.
In some of its recent cases, the Court has stressed that the reason for
requiring contacts with the forum is to give defendants "fair warning"
about what conduct will subject them to jurisdiction 210 and allow them to
"structure their primary conduct" to control where they will be subject to
jurisdiction.211 This does not, however, explain why boundaries matter or,
to put it differently, why defendants have a constitutional right to know and
be able to control whether they will be subject to jurisdiction in any given
state. We could have a strict liability personal jurisdictions system in which
defendants could be sued wherever their conduct caused injury. In substan-
tive tort law, strict liability is clearly constitutional. If a defendant engaged
in certain activities can be liable whenever injury occurs, why can't that
defendant be subject to suit wherever injury occurs? 212
Although the Court has apparently thought it obvious that subjecting a
defendant to jurisdiction in a state as to which the defendant has no contacts
is a taking of "liberty," I must admit that I do not find this quite so clear. It
is true, of course, that the Court has in a variety of contexts construed very
broadly the word "liberty" as it is used in the due process clause,213 but the
208. Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxete de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 n. 10
(1982).
209. The Court continues to stress the importance of the defendant having purposeful contacts with
the forum. See, e.g., Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 105 S. Ct. 2174,2181-82 (1985); Helicopteros
Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 417 (1984).
210. Burger King Corp., 105 S. Ct. at 2182 (quoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 218 (1977)
(Stevens, J., concurring)).
211. Id. (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980)).
212. Professor Brilmayer in her article on personal jurisdiction raised this analogy betweeen
substantive strict liability and personal jurisdiction. Brilmayer, supra note 201, at 94-95. She con-
cluded that although it is constitutional as a matter of substantive law to hold people strictly liable for
certain conduct, strict liability personal jurisdiction is not constitutional. For a discussion of her
rationale, see supra note 207.
213. A classic description of the scope of liberty is that given in Meyers v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390,
399 (1923), quoted in Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573 (1972):
[Liberty] denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to
contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to
marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own
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Court has also noted that the range of interests protected by that clause "is
not infinite." 214 The right to be free from litigation in a state to which one
has not purposefully connected oneself does not seem to be one of those
obvious fundamental rights "valued by sensible men." 215 Moreover, this
supposed liberty interest seems different from other constitutionally pro-
tected liberty interests. A defendant in civil litigation remains free to go
about all aspects of her life as she chooses. Admittedly, litigation can be an
inconvenience in that defendants are subject to discovery and certain other
compulsory processes, 216 but these burdens are the result of the fact of
litigation and have nothing to do with the place of the litigation. Moreover,
the location of litigation does not make that litigation unfair or arbitrary, 217
provided that the proceeding is not so distant that the defendant is unable to
attend or prepare a defense. 218
conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized . . . as essential to the
orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.
See Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 545-46 (1977) (White, J., dissenting); Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
214. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571 (1972); see also cases cited supra in note 197.
215. Monaghan, supra note 197, at 409. Recently, in Daniels v. Williams, 106 S. Ct. 662 (1986),
the Supreme Court enumerated three purposes served by the due process clause. According to Justice
Rehnquist, that clause "was 'intended to secure the individual from the arbitrary exercise of the powers
of government,"' id. at 665 (quoting Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 527 (1884)), promotes
fairness in the decision-making process, 106 S. Ct. at 665, and "serves to prevent governmental power
from being used for purposes of oppression."' Id. (quoting Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land &
Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (16 How.) 272,277 (1856)). Though personal jurisdiction has nothing to do
with decisional fairness nor with concerns about preventing government power from being used for
purposes of oppression, one might argue that it is an "arbitrary exercise of the powers of government"
for a state to take jurisdiction of a case where the defendant has not purposefully connected himself with
the state. However, the cases in which the Supreme Court has found in personam jurisdiction can hardly
be characterized as arbitrary attempts by those states to exercise power. There was nothing arbitrary in
Delaware's attempt to take jurisdiction over the directors of a Delaware corporation, see Shaffer v.
Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977), or California's attempt in a child support case to get jurisdiction over the
father where the children were residing in California, see Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 74 (1978).
or Oklahoma's attempt to get jurisdiction over the seller of a car which blew up in Oklahoma, see World-
Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980). In none of these cases was the state acting in
a capricious way. In all of these cases there were plausible reasons for the exercise of governmental
authority.
216. See, e.g.. FED. R. Civ. P. II, 37; see also Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 105 S. Ct. 2965.
2973 (1985) (discussing the "burdens" to which defendants are subject).
217. Professor Van Alystne has argued that there is a liberty interest in "freedom from arbitrary
adjudicative procedures." Van Alystne, Cracks in "The New Property": Adjudicative Due Process in
the Administrative State. 62 CORNELL L. REv. 445, 487 (1977). The place of the litigation, however,
does not seem to make that litigation "arbitrary," at least as Van Alystne uses that word. He defines
arbitrary procedures as ones that are "fundamentally unfair, biased, arbitrary, summary, peremptory,
ex parte means that without justification create an intolerable margin of probable error or prejudice."
Id. at 488.
218. See Redish, supra note 186, at 1113-14. Professor Redish argues that the test for jurisdiction
should be whether the parties will suffer meaningful inconvenience. Id. at 1138.
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Though the Court has not seen fit since Pennoyer to offer much analysis
of the interests protected by personal jurisdiction, a few commentators have
suggested that the liberty interest protected by due process is "the defen-
dant's interest in freedom from an unrelated sovereign. 219 This explana-
tion seems to derive at least in part from a social contract theory of
government, 220 and appears to be based on the idea that one ought not be
subject to a judicial system which one did not choose and as to which one
has no political input.221 One might elaborate further and note that even
today, states retain an importance beyond merely being political subunits.
States are to some extent mechanisms "for recognition of social and
cultural group differences" 222 and people identify with their own states and
feel like outsiders in other states. This justification for the territorial
component of personal jurisdiction is not without its appeal, at least in the
context of individuals and their personal affairs though it is somewhat less
persuasive in a commercial context. 223 Moreover to the extent personal
jurisdiction is based on concerns about bias and prejudice, those concerns
can be met largely through diversity jurisdiction and removal to the federal
courts. 224 Further, while it may be that some people feel like outsiders in a
particular state and wish they didn't have to litigate there, a question
remains: What gives them a constitutional right not to litigate there? As
Professor Redish has observed, "[U]nder our constitutional system, the
inquiry is not why should a state be allowed to take an action, but why
shouldn't a state be allowed to do so. "225 Finally, if one accepts that there is
a constitutionally protected liberty interest, plaintiffs as well as defendants
should have such an interest.226 Why should the plaintiff be forced to resort
to the courts of some other state to vindicate her rights? Plaintiffs, like
219. Drobak, supra note 53, at 1047.
220. See J. LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT § 119 (P. Laslett ed. 1960).
221. See Carrington& Martin, Substantive Interests and the Jurisdiction ofState Courts, 66 MIcH.
L. REv. 227,237 (1967); Redish, supra note 186, at 1125; Weisburd, supra note 199, at 378, 416 n. 126.
The Court has never relied on this rationale as an explanation for its approach to judicial jurisdiction.
See Redish, supra note 186, at 1125. Nor has it used this as the justification for the limitations which
exist on state authority to tax nonresidents or to apply its laws to nonresidents. See supra note 199.
222. Hunter, Federalism and State Taxation of Multistate Enterprises, 32 EMORY L.J. 89, 130
(1983).
223. See Jay, supra note 151, at 446.
224. See Redish, supra note 186, at 1139.
225. Id. at 1134 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
226. See Brilmayer, supra note 201, at 89; Leubsdorf, Constitutional Civil Procedure, 63 TEx. L.
REv. 579, 610-11 (1984); Lewis, supra note 45, at 810; Lewis, A Brave New World for Personal
Jurisdiction: Flexible Tests Under Uniform Standards, 37 VAND. L. REv. 1, 26 (1984); McDougal,
supra note 187, at 9.
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defendants, are subject to sanctions227 and the compulsory processes 228 of
the court; they may be forced to defend against counterclaims-even
counterclaims unrelated to the original claim. 229 No one likes to be an
outsider in a strange place, but it is not clear why the Constitution should
protect defendants but not plaintiffs from this unhappy situation. 230
B. The Future of Personal Jurisdiction
In recent years, there have been occasional hints that the Court might be
moving toward a reconsideration of some enduring elements of Pennoyer.
On closer examination, however, the Court seems to be doing more
tinkering than a fundamental reassessment. For example, in Insurance
Corporation of Ireland, the Court acknowledged that personal jurisdiction
protects an individual liberty interest, not the sovereignty of states. 231
Some, including Justice Powell, thought this foretold the elimination of the
minimum contacts requirement. 232 However, in subsequent cases the Court
has continued to emphasize that a purposeful "contact" with the forum is
still required, even if that contact need not be physical. 233 Similarly, the
Court has suggested that it might begin moving away from its treatment of
personal jurisdiction as a confrontation between the government and one
227. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 11; OHIo R. Civ. P. 11;1 MICH. STAT. ANN. RULE2.114.
228. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 37; OHIo R. Civ. P. 37; 1 MICH. STAT. ANN. RULE 2.313.
229. See Adam v. Saenger, 303 U.S. 59, 68-69 (1938); Brandtjen & Kluge, Inc. v. Joseph
Freeman, Inc., 75 F.2d 472,472-73 (2d Cir.), aff'd on other grounds sub nom. Chandler & Price Co. v.
Brandtjen & Kluge, Inc., 296 U.S. 53 (1935); Mayer v. Development Corp. of Am., 396 F. Supp. 917,
933 (D. Del. 1975); G & M Tire Corp. v. Dunlop Tire & Rubber Corp., 36 F.R.D. 440,441 (N.D. Miss.
1964). See generally C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 1416, 1424
(1969).
230. Professor Weisburd has asserted that it is not appropriate to consider the interest of the
plaintiff in assessing the proper reach of personal jurisdiction. Weisburd, supra note 199, at 423-27. He
argues that a court's failure to take jurisdiction does not deprive the plaintiff of any property interest
because the court's failure to take the case does not affect the plaintiff's substantive claim. Id. at 423.
There are several responses that can be made to this. First, this argument can be turned on its head and
the same said of defendants: that is, the court's accepting jurisdiction does not offend any property right
of the defendant because the mere accepting of jurisdiction does not affect the defendant's substantive
defenses. Second, the Supreme Court has recently acknowledged that a plaintiff does have a property
interest in his claim and the denial of a forum to adjudicate that claim can violate due process. See Logan
v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422,428-29 (1982); see also Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 105
S. Ct. 2965, 2973 (1985). Finally, if defendants have some "liberty interest" which is affected by the
place of litigation, why is the same not true of plaintiffs?
231. Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinea, 456 U.S. 694.702 (1982).
232. Id. at 713 (Powell, J., concurring); see Burstein v. State Bar, 693 F.2d 511 (5th Cir. 1982).
233. See, e.g., Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984); Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 105 S. Ct.
2174 (1985); see also Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 107 S. Ct. 1026, 1031 (O'Connor, J., for
the plurality), 1036 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and in the judgment) (1987) (although the Court
was split on the application of this standard to the facts of the particular case, there was no disagreement
that knowing "contacts" were necessary).
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party and instead try to accommodate the interests of both parties. In
Burger King, the Court stated that a relevant factor in assessing jurisdiction
is "the plaintiff's interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief," and
even indicated that where this or other considerations were particularly
compelling, it might require "a lesser showing of minimum contacts than
would otherwise be required. ' 234 Nonetheless, the threshold inquiry re-
mains whether the defendant "purposefully established minimum contacts
within the forum." 235 Thus, the primary focus continues to be the rela-
tionship between the forum and one party (the defendant), not a balancing
of the respective rights of the two parties. 236
IV. CONCLUSION
Pennoyer is in many ways an extraordinary case. As the facts and Judge
Deady's opinion demonstrate, this case would have been an excellent
vehicle for a more narrowly focused Supreme Court opinion dealing with
the problem of notice. Justice Field,-however, elected to write an opinion
that went far beyond the actual case before him, but that conformed to his
natural law philosophy and his views on substantive due process. Iron-
ically, personal jurisdiction doctrine seems to be the longest surviving
remnant of Field's approach to the fourteenth amendment. In the area of
state economic regulation, the Court has largely rejected substantive due
process, and even in those areas in which the doctrine retains vitality, the
court has become increasingly circumspect in its delineation of the scope of
the liberty interests protected by substantive due process. 237 By contrast, in
the area of personal jurisdiction, although the test applied by the Court has
234. Burger King, 105 S. Ct. at 2184; see also Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 107 S. Ct.
1026, 1034 (1987) (noting that the plaintiff had little interest in litigating the case in the forum).
235. Burger King, 105 S. Ct. at 2184. Recently, in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 105 S. Ct.
2965, 2975 (1985), the Court acknowledged that the fourteenth amendment protects persons, not
merely defendants. In that case the issue was whether a state court had personal jurisdiction over
unnamed plaintiff class members with no connection with the state. The Court held that the state did
have personal jurisdiction over all the plaintiff class members and explained that "a forum State may
exercise jurisdiction over the claim of an absent class-action plaintiff, even though that plaintiff may not
possess the minimum contacts with the forum which would support personal jurisdiction over a
defendant." Id. at 2975.
236. This approach contrasts with the approach in other areas of procedural due process in which
the Court has recognized that the rights of the defendant are not absolute and that some balance must be
struck between the rights of the defendant and the rights of the plaintiff. For example, in the area of
notice, the Court has indicated that extraordinary measures need not be taken, even though the result
may be that the defendant never learns of the suit against him. Mullane v. Central HanoverBank & Trust
Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950). Likewise, the Court has appeared to move toward a balancing of plaintiffs'
and defendants' interests in the area of prejudgment attachment. See Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416
U.S. 600 (1974); Leubsdorf, supra note 226, at 610-11.
237. See supra notes 213-14 and accompanying text.
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changed over the years, the doctrinal underpinning of territorial power,
articulated in dicta 100 years ago, remains largely intact and unquestioned.
Justice Field would surely be pleased.
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